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ST. THOMAS, INTERPRETER OF AVICENNA
Beatrice H. Zedler

MATTER AS A SUBJECT OF PREDICATION IN ARISTOTLE
Richard J. Blackwell

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN ST. ANSELM AND DESCARTES *Continued*
Robert G. Miller, C.S.B.

Notes and Discussion, Book Reviews

Saint Louis University

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Beatrice H. Zedler

ST. THOMAS, INTERPRETER OF AVICENNA

Dr. Beatrice H. Zedler *received her M.A. from Marquette University, and her Ph.D. from Fordham University. She has taught at Marian College (Fond du Lac, Wis.), College Misericordia (Dallas, Pa.), and Marquette University, where she now is an associate professor of philosophy. She has written for* The Modern Schoolman, Traditio, New Scholasticism, *and the* Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.

Among the many writers whom St. Thomas discusses is Avicenna, the tenth-century Persian thinker whose Arabic writings in Latin translation had penetrated Christian Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The theory of emanation and the doctrine of the agent intellect in its function as *dator formarum* are topics that St. Thomas often discusses. He states them correctly, analyzes their implications, and then rejects them.[1] But there is another basic Avicennian view, less studied by scholars of Western thought, that St. Thomas also refers to; it is Avicenna's doctrine on God's knowledge of the singular. The question with which we shall here be concerned is this: Is St. Thomas a good interpreter of this teaching of Avicenna?

There are reasons for asking this question. We may not take it for granted that St. Thomas is always a good historian of Avicenna's ideas. If a statement of a thinker's view in terms of that thinker's own context is requisite in a historian's work, then the Avicenna of history does not always appear in St. Thomas's lines. For example, St. Thomas quotes Avicenna's words, "God's action is supremely liberal," as a confirmation of his own point that no good accrues to the Creator from the production of the creature;[2] but he avoids mentioning here that for Avicenna God has no freedom to create or not to create; rather, the divine liberality makes it *necessary* for God to produce the world.[3] The reference to God as *maxime liberalis* is thus plucked from its

Avicennian context and given a meaning consistent with St. Thomas's own view.

In another text St. Thomas cites Avicenna's view that souls are not created apart from their bodies.[4] Now, Avicenna does hold that the soul begins to exist *as* an individual soul only when the corporeal mat-

[1]On emanation cf. *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 16, resp., and a. 4, resp.; *ST*, I, q. 47, a. 1; *CG*, II, cap. 42. Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 8, resp.; *ibid.*, q. 5, a. 1, a. 5, and ad 5; *CG*, II, cap. 74; *De Ver.*, q. 11, a. 1, resp.

[2]*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 10, resp.

[3]Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysices Compendium*, ed. by N. Carame (Rome: Pontificale Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1926), Lib. I, Pars II, tr. 5, p. 131; *ibid.*, tr. 1, p. 75; *Metaphysica, Opera* (Venice, 1508), VIII, c. 6, fol. 99v-110r; *ibid.*, c. 7, fol. 100vb; *ibid.*, IX, c. 4, fol. 104v.

Avicenna's God gives being to creatures only in the sense that He does not prevent the infinite fecundity of His nature from extending to their production. The only sign of His liberty is His acquiescence in this necessary emanation which, willy-nilly, proceeds from Him. Here is a God who is liberal only in the sense that, existentially speaking, He is *not* free to be without creatures. As A. Forest points out (*La Structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin* [Paris: J. Vrin, 1931], pp. 141, 153, 161), Avicenna and St. Thomas were not speaking of the same thing when they affirmed the divine liberty. For a further contrast between the God of St. Thomas and the God of Avicenna, cf. B. Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" *Traditio*, VI, 1948, pp. 110-22, 133-46; and "The Inner Unity of the De Potentia," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXV (January, 1948), 99-101.

[4]*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 10, resp.

[5]*Lib. VI Naturalium (De Anima), Opera* (Venice, 1508), V, c. 3, fol. 24rb.

[6]*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 10, resp.; ad 10, 11, 12, 16.

[7]In the famous argument of the "flying man," Avicenna identifies man with his soul and establishes the substantiality of the soul and its independence of the body in knowing itself (*Lib. VI Naturalium [De Anima]* V, c. 7, fol. 27rb-va). The soul of its essence therefore has no necessary relationship to the body; nothing within its nature requires that it animate the body. Yet this much concession is made to Aristotle, that apart from its own essential aspects the soul rules the body and has some relations to it (*ibid.*, c. 1, fol. 1 rb-vb). Though the soul knows through itself and not through its instruments, the soul can receive sensations through the body and in this way the body helps the soul (*ibid.*, c. 2, fol. 23va; c. 3, fol. 24a). The soul, in turn, can help the body; it is created in view of the good of the body and, in fact, begins to exist as an individual only when that body which it is to direct and provide for begins to exist (*ibid.*, c. 3, fol. 24g). This, then, is the setting within which Avicenna says that souls are united to their bodies from their beginning. But since nothing within the essence of the soul requires its union with the body, the soul is not here the *form* of the body, nor is the unity of man safeguarded.

[8]St. Thomas was well aware that Avicenna did *not* hold that the soul is the form of the body and pointed out the similarity of his view to that of Plato. Cf. *ST*, I, q. 84, a. 4; *CG*, II, cap. 74; *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 8; *De Virtut. in Com.*, a. 8; *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4. He also knew that the Avicennian God was not truly liberal but produced "creatures" *per necessitatem naturae*. Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 4 and a. 16; *ibid.*, q. 5, a. 3; *ST*, I, q. 47, a. 1.

For other texts quoted with an un-Avicennian implication, cf. *De Pot.*, q. 2, a. 3; *ibid.*, q. 3, a. 1, sed contra, and q. 5; *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2 (in second group of answers).

[9]Giles of Rome, *Errores Philosophorum*,

ter which will be its kingdom and its instrument begins to exist.[5] But a reader knowing Avicenna only by this citation in St. Thomas would be likely to conclude that Avicenna and St. Thomas held similar views on the nature of man. For here Avicenna's view that souls were united to bodies from their beginning is cited *against* Plato's definition of man as a soul using a body, and as harmonious with a context in which St. Thomas upholds the unity of man and the doctrine of the soul as perfection and *form* of the body.[6] But such a context cannot be found within the writings of Avicenna, who holds that nothing within the nature of the soul requires its union with the body.[7] Here again St. Thomas has given a "Thomistic" meaning to a line which occurred in an un-Thomistic context. And he has done so not through ignorance[8] but perhaps through design.

If we ask why St. Thomas has at times shifted another's meaning to fit in with his own context, a hint of the answer can be found in his purpose to study what men have thought in order to discover the truth. He did not seek to be primarily a historian but a lover of truth. The most gracious deed he could do for the great thinkers of old was to show, wherever possible, how their words could serve to manifest some aspect of truth. Such intellectual charity coincided also with prudence. It helped to render harmless those non-Christian writers who were carefully studied in St. Thomas's time. Whenever the text can possibly permit it, St. Thomas interprets Avicenna in a favorable light and tries to make him a proper companion for thirteenth-century Christians. Often the doctrines are quite accurately reported and St. Thomas approves or disapproves of their content as the situation demands; but because of the occasional exception to such objective reporting, there is reason for asking: Does St. Thomas correctly interpret Avicenna's position on the doctrine of God's knowledge of the singular?

Another reason for raising the question is that a full and exact knowledge of Avicenna's position on this topic was not commonly possessed by thirteenth-century thinkers. They held that for Avicenna God has no direct knowledge of singulars but only of universals. Giles of Rome, for example, lists the following proposition among the errors of Avicenna: "God does not know singulars in their individual natures."[9] Now there is good foundation for this view in Avicenna's works; yet

Avicenna also has taught that "not even the weight of an atom is hidden from God's knowledge."[10] If these words were pulled out of context, they could easily fit into the context of Christian thought. If they were ignored, Avicenna's view would be left in sharp opposition to Christian teaching. How, then, does St. Thomas treat them? How exact a statement and analysis of Avicenna's view on this topic does one find in St. Thomas?

To answer these questions, we shall study first the position of Avicenna, as known to us through the Latin text of his work,[11] and secondly St. Thomas's statement and analysis of this position.

Avicenna's Position on God's Knowledge of the Singular

To understand Avicenna's view on this problem, we must first recall the context within which it appears, and that is the context of Avicenna's cosmogony.

Avicenna places at the summit of his universe a Necessary Being who is one, incorporeal, indivisible, and the source of all other beings. This Necessary Being does not produce other things as though intending them, however; for then He would act for something lower than Himself and introduce multiplicity within the divine essence. The Necessary Being is therefore a *Necesse Esse* in a double sense: He not only exists necessarily, but He must act necessarily as well, and His act is an act of self-reflection.

The first effect, the result of the Necessary Being's act of self-reflection, cannot be many without destroying the simplicity of the

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ed. by J. Koch, tr. by J. O. Riedl (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1944), p. 39, no. 16, and p. 33, no. 13. Cf. also "Condemnation of 1270" (*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. by H. Denifle and A. Chatelain [Paris, 1889], I): Prop. 10, "Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se"; Prop. 11, "Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia" (p. 486). Cf. also "Condemnation of 1277": Prop. 3, "Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se," and Prop. 56, "Quod Deus non potest immediate cognoscere contingentia, nisi per particularem causam et proximam" (pp. 544, 546). These propositions, derived by Christians from Arabian philosophy, may have been regarded by them as both Averroistic and Avicennian. Cf. R. de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1934), pp. 37-38.

[10] *Metaphys. Comp.*, Lib. I, Pars II, tr. 4, p. 121.

[11] It was not, of course, the Ibn Sīnā of the Arabic text, but Avicenna, in the Latin translations of his works, that St. Thomas knew. It is therefore the Avicenna of the Latin version with whom we are mainly concerned here.

[12] Avicenna, *Metaphys.*, IX, c. 4, fol. 104v-105r; cf. also *Metaphys. Comp.*, Lib. I, Pars IV, tr. 1, p. 185; tr. 2, pp. 186-96.

[13] *Metaphys. Comp.*, Lib. I, Pars I, tr. 7, pp. 63-64.

[14] *Metaphys.*, IX, c. 4, fol. 104v-105r.

divine essence. It must therefore be one, for from one simple thing only one can proceed. It is a pure intelligence and, though one, is not a pure unity, for it can think of the First Being; and when it does, it gives rise to the intelligence which is immediately beneath it. Moreover, within the essence of the first intelligence lies the germ of multiplicity because it has within itself the foundation of a dual relationship. With respect to its cause, the necessarily acting First Being, it is necessary; but taken in itself, it is only possible. The act by which the first intelligence knows itself as necessary by virtue of the First Being gives rise to the form or soul of the outermost sphere; the act by which the first intelligence knows itself as possible in itself gives rise to the body of this same sphere. Then the second intelligence, in similar fashion, gives rise to a third intelligence, to the soul of the second sphere, and to the body of the second sphere. From the third intelligence there likewise flows a triad: a fourth intelligence, the soul of the third sphere, the body of the third sphere. This cascade emanation is gradually halted only with the production of the sphere of the moon and the last intelligence which is called the agent intellect. The agent intellect, instead of begetting the soul and body of a sphere, begets human souls and the four elements.[12]

This theory may look like an account of the origin of the universe, but such was not Avicenna's intention. There is no radical beginning of finite being here. "To begin to be" signifies only a priority of the nature of nonbeing to being; and hence a "beginning" for him refers not to "just one *now* of time but to every time and age." "Therefore," he concludes, "it is impossible that a thing begin to be after it did not exist, since matter would precede it from which it would begin to be."[13] For Avicenna the universe is *given*—necessarily and eternally. For this reason the theory of emanation is primarily a description, in temporal imagery, of the eternal relations of the world to its God.

Why did Avicenna posit this complex hierarchical structure? He was moved by an anxiety to save the unity of God. As we have seen, he could not let his God intend the things which come forth from Him because "this would introduce multiplicity into His essence."[14] Here, where things do not proceed from God freely but necessarily as a "concomitant" of His essence, the many could not come forth from God

directly unless they had first been many within His essence.[15] But that would be destructive of God's unity. If the divine simplicity is to be saved in this necessary procession, then, the first effect of the first cause must be one in number; and in the emanative process which follows there can be only a gradual progression to multiplicity. By a theory of *mediate* creation the many are related to the One, and yet the One is spared the danger of any direct encounter with the many. The intermediate intelligences thus have the function of securing, so far as possible, a peaceful coexistence of the many and the One.

Within this metaphysical scheme for saving God's unity is a certain presupposition about the nature of God's knowledge. A direct production of the many is here excluded because a direct knowledge of the many is excluded; and the latter is excluded lest it would thrust multiplicity into the divine essence. The ever-present fear of a threat to God's simplicity motivates the comments both on the order of production and on the order of knowledge which is its prerequisite. But let us now look more closely at the comments on God's knowledge and its object.

As we might expect, Avicenna says that the Necessary Being knows things only in a universal way. He cannot know them through the things themselves; for if He did, either His essence would have to be constituted of that which He knows, or else He would have to receive impressions of them from another. Either alternative is, of course, absurd.[16]

But, then, how and what does the Necessary Being know? As the principle of all being, He knows from His essence that of which He *is* the principle. Now, He is the principle of all perfect beings (the intelligences) according to their singularity. But as for generable and corruptible things, He is their principle first according to their species

[15] *Ibid.* Note: ". . . esse omnis eius quod fit a primo non est nisi secundum viam comitandi."

[16] *Metaphys. Comp.*, Lib. I, Pars II, tr. 4, pp. 118-120; *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100rb.

[17] *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100rb.

[18] *Metaphys. Comp.*, p. 121; *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100rb: ". . . necesse esse non intelligit quidquid est, nisi universaliter . . ."

[19] *Metaphys. Comp.*, p. 121.

[20] *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100rb.

[21] *Sûrah*, XXIV, 3, tr. by M. Pickthall, *The Glorious Koran* (New York: New American Lib., 1953).

[22] *Ibid.*, VI, 59. Cf. also II, 29; XIII, 8; XVI, 28; XXIV, 64; XLI, 47; XLII, 12; LXIV, 4.

[23] *Metaphys. Comp.*, p. 121; *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100rb.

and, through their species, their principle of them as individuals. This means that He cannot know these variable individuals *as* variable in an individuated mode of knowing limited by time; for that would imply that His essence would vary with the variations of the objects of His knowledge. Nor can He in His immaterial essence know corruptible things *as* corruptible; if they are apprehended as joined to matter, to its accidents, to time, or to an individuated state, then they are not understood by an intellect but only sensed or imagined.[17]

It would seem, then, that the Necessary Being does not know individuals *as* individuals. "Necesse-esse nihil intelligit nisi modo universali," says Avicenna;[18] and this is a position which seems to fit logically within an emanationist view where God must be protected from the menace of the many.

Yet Avicenna surprises his readers by adding this unexpected assertion: "Not even the weight of an atom whether in the heavens or on earth, is hidden from God's knowledge."[19] And in the *Metaphysics* he says: "A knowledge of the singular is not lacking to Him; He does not lack knowledge of the least thing on heaven and on earth."[20]

These statements clearly echo some famous lines in the Koran: "Not an atom's weight, or less than that or greater, escapeth Him in the heavens or in the earth, but it is in a clear Record."[21] "And He knoweth what is in the land and the sea. Not a leaf falleth but He knoweth it, not a grain amid the darkness of the earth, naught of wet or dry but (it is noted) in a clear record."[22] The obvious similarity in thought and expression suggests that Avicenna the philosopher was seeking room in his system for a doctrine which Avicenna the Moslem had learned. That the two roles were not easily merged into one on this problem Avicenna himself seemed aware of. For he warns his readers that this combination of God's universal knowledge and His knowledge of the weight of an atom is a marvel which requires much keenness of mind to understand.[23] One suspects that even his own keen mind found it difficult to explain both that God does and does not know material singulars. How can Avicenna maintain that God knows only in a universal way and yet also that God knows the least thing on heaven and earth?

A hint of his solution has already been given. He has implied that

God knows species directly; and indirectly, *through* species, He knows individuals.[24] This hint is developed in texts which follow. The One as the principle of all being knows all the causes and their harmonies; in knowing the causes He knows also the effects to which they lead. Therefore, he understands singular things inasmuch as they are universal; that is, inasmuch as they have certain properties, which individualize by establishing relations to time and a determined disposition. The attribution of such properties gives to individual things a definition and description which pertains exclusively to them.[25]

To explain more clearly how it is that a material singular can be known in its causes, Avicenna borrows an analogy from astronomy. He comments on our knowledge of an eclipse. Since we know all the movements of the heavens, he says, we can know every eclipse that will determinately take place; but we know it in a universal way (that is, *through* our knowledge of its causes, the movements of the

[24] *Metaphys. Comp.*, p. 120.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22; *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100rb-va.

[26] *Metaphys. Comp.*, pp. 122-23; *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100va.

[27] *Metaphys. Comp.*, pp. 123-24; *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100 va.

[28] *Metaphys. Comp.*, pp. 124-25; *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100va-b.

[29] A.-M. Goichon, (*La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sīnā* [Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937], pp. 272-77) thinks that the reference to a discursive way of knowing cannot designate merely an intuitive grasping of the relations among things but suggests a progression in knowledge. Because Avicenna stresses the freedom of God from time, God's knowledge is a progression *without time* through causes to effects; that is, though all of His knowledge of singulars is possessed simultaneously, it is a *mediate* knowledge, as His "creation" is a mediate creation. Cf. also Goichon, *La Philosophie d'Avicenne et son influence en Europe médiévale* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1951), pp. 37-40, especially n. 2, pp. 37ff.

N. Carame, in the introduction to *Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium* (pp. xxvi-xxxviii), frankly admits the difficulty of reconciling Avicenna's view on this problem with a doctrine of mediate and indirect creation (p. xxxvii). His interpretation of Avicenna is this: *Ex parte cogniti* (or *termini*) God knows particulars according to their particularity, but *ex parte cognoscentis* He does not know particulars by particular knowledge. That is, He does not know them with the mutability and defectiveness found in human knowers, but He does know them by pure intuition into the knowledge presented by celestial souls (pp. xxxvi-xxxviii).

L. Gardet (*La Pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* [Paris: Vrin, 1951], pp. 72-85), gives the following interpretation. Because of the stress upon the immutable eternity of God, there can be no really successive knowledge in God, for Avicenna. The divine knowledge of singulars is intuitive, and God grasps it through His essence. He grasps the *results* of discursive knowledge (induction and deduction) of creatures who alone know the singular according to its singularity.

For other comments on Avicenna's meaning, cf. C. de Vaux, *Avicenne* (Paris: Alcan, 1900), pp. 258-62; D. Saliba, *Étude sur la métaphysique d'Avicenne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), pp. 119-21, 155-58; G. Quadri, *La Philosophie arabe dans l'Europe médiévale*, tr. by R. Huret (Paris: Payot, 1947), p. 98; C. Fabro, "Avicenna e la conoscenza divina dei particolari", in *Bolletino Filosofico*, I (1935), pp. 45-54.

heavens). So we can say of some one eclipse that it will take place after the time of the crossing of such a star from such a place; it will have this particular quality; and between this eclipse and another past or future similar eclipse, just so much time will elapse. Nothing will therefore happen to that eclipse that we shall not know; yet we shall know it in a universal way.[26]

Avicenna recognizes, though, that at this point his readers might protest. Even all this knowledge is not the same as *seeing* the eclipse here and now with our sense of sight. Avicenna concedes that sense knowledge has a certain immediacy that is lacking in purely intellectual speculation, since it enables us to know a thing not just in its causes but as occurring here and now; what we must do, then, is to add to the intellectual apprehension a knowledge already acquired by the sense of sight.

If anyone is unwilling to call this a knowledge of particulars in a universal mode, Avicenna will not object. His concern is not with the terminology, but with the problem of explaining how changing, particular things can be known by an unchanging knower without causing change in the knower.

Our intellectual knowledge, of course, is variable; there is first one cognition of an eclipse as future, and later another cognition of it as present. But suppose that our knowledge were eternal and could grasp every eclipse at once. It would still apprehend particular eclipses *through* its understanding of all their causes; but being eternal, it would know any particular eclipse not as future but in the immediacy of the *now*. It is thus that God apprehends particulars—in their causes and under a universal mode; but since He is eternal He knows them in the present.[27] The implication is that for Avicenna's God, to know a thing in its causes as it is happening is to know it as a singular.

Avicenna strongly insists that when he speaks of God's knowledge of things in their causes, he is referring to *all* the causes of things. When such knowledge is had, then the apprehension is extended discursively to all the effects. God, in knowing Himself as the first cause, knows the whole ordered series of causes and effects which flow from Him.[28]

The reference to *discursive* knowledge has prompted several comments.[29] From the context of Avicenna's work it is clear that he could

not have meant to imply a progression or change within the divine knowledge. What he seems to have meant is merely that an eternal God knows singular effects through their universal causes. How, then, does God know an atom in its singularity? He knows it *now* in the eternity of His knowledge and in its universal causes.

To the extent to which He would have any further knowledge of it in its material singularity, He would need to be informed by creatures,[30] for He is not the direct or intentional cause of the atom. In the order of knowledge as in the order of production many levels of being bridge the gulf between God and the atom. That is why Avicenna must say that God can know directly in its singularity only the first effect; as to generable and corruptible things, He knows them directly only in their species, and indirectly or mediately insofar as they are individuals.[31] "Necesse-esse nihil intelligit nisi modo universali" is the most consistent description of the knowledge possessed by his God. How Avicenna could have thought this consistent with God's knowledge of the singular is a point that St. Thomas chose to examine.

St. Thomas on Avicenna

In several texts St. Thomas reveals his awareness of Avicenna's position on this question. Sometimes Avicenna is explicitly named, and sometimes his view is introduced by a "quidam dixerunt" or an "alii dixerunt." St. Thomas writes:

> Now some . . . said that God knows singular things through universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an

[30]Cf. Carame, introduction to *Metaphys. Comp.*, pp. xxxii-xxxiii; Gardet, *La Pensée religieuse d'Avicenne*, pp. 78-81; Goichon, *La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sīnā*, pp. 298-299; S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris: Franck, 1859), p. 362.

[31]*Metaphys. Comp.*, p. 120.

[32]*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 11., ed. by A. C. Pegis, *Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1945).

[33]*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 5. Other texts paraphrasing the key texts of Avicenna (*Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100rb; *Metaphys. Comp.* Lib. I, Pars II, tr. 4) are: *ST*, I, q. 57, a. 2; *CG*, I, cap. 66; *De An.*, q. I, a. 20; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 11, resp.; *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, sol.

[34]*In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

[35]*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 11.

[36]*Ibid.*, a. 7, obj. 2.

[37]*Ibid.*, ad 2 and resp. Goichon (*La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sīnā*, p. 273, n. 1) observes that in distinguishing between "*per* causam" and "in causa," St. Thomas is distinguishing the Latin equivalents of the Arabic *min* (Ibn Sīnā's word in this context) and *fi*.

[38]*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 11.

astronomer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come.[32]

And in the *De Veritate:*

> And therefore others, such as Avicenna and his followers, have said that God knows every singular as though in the universal, when he knows all universal causes, from which the singular is produced; just as if an astronomer who would know all the motions of the heavens and the distances of celestial bodies, would know every eclipse which will occur even for a hundred years; he would not however know it inasmuch as it is a certain singular, so that he would know that it now exists or does not exist, as a peasant knows when he sees it. And in this way, they hold, God knows singulars; not as though he looks at their singular nature, but through the position of the universal causes.[33]

Other passages develop further the paraphrase of Avicenna's key texts on the question. They point out that all those universal causes lead back to God Himself, who in knowing Himself knows all second causes and in knowing those second causes knows all that is an effect of those causes, though only universally.[34] There is here the suggestion that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects[35] or by a kind of discursive knowledge.[36]

But St. Thomas does more than paraphrase Avicenna's discussion. He also provides an analysis and critique which give us a clue to the coherence of Avicenna's thought.

St. Thomas criticizes the view that God knows singular effects *through* Himself as their cause and stresses that God's knowledge is in no way discursive. "God does not know first a cause," says St. Thomas, "and then, through it, its hitherto supposedly unknown effects; He knows the effects in the cause."[37] Even if God's knowledge could be discursive, His knowledge of singular things would not be explained by saying that He applies to them their universal causes, "for no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that other thing. Hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular; it rather presupposes the knowledge of singular things."[38]

Why, then, should Avicenna have thought that knowledge of universal causes would in any way suffice to explain a knowledge of the singular? It is, St. Thomas points out, because he assumes that a singular thing is constituted by a coming together of intelligible forms. In a paragraph in which he states and criticizes Avicenna's position, St. Thomas says:

> But from assembled universal forms, however many there be, something singular is not constituted; because the collection of those forms can still be understood to be in many things; and therefore if someone were to know an eclipse through universal causes, he would know nothing singular but only universal.[39]

A similar analysis appears in the *Commentary on the Sentences:*

> For to know a singular in this way [i.e. as Avicenna has described] in the universal, is not to know the proper nature of this or that singular; in whatever way universals are combined a singular would never be made from them unless they are individuated through matter. And therefore from this way also it would follow that God would not have perfect knowledge of singulars. For universal causes do not lead to a knowledge of particulars, except insofar as particulars share a common nature, and so from universal causes there would be no knowledge of the particular except as it has such or such a common nature, either accidentally or substantially.[40]

One can, for example, add together *white, musical,* and any other characteristics and still not reach *this individual man* since all these characteristics can belong to many.[41] In universal causes a thing is not known with its individual conditions, so that one can say of it, "It is here and now." St. Thomas points out that even Avicenna is aware that God does not know particulars in a particular mode so that He can say, "This now is, and now it is not," since he has indicated that to know an eclipse in its universal causes is not the same as to know it by a direct sense perception.[42]

[39] *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 5. Cf. also *Quodl.*, VII, q. I, a. 3.

[40] *In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

[41] *De An.*, q. 1, a. 20. Cf. also *ST*, I, q. 14, a. 11.

[42] *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 3, sol.

[43] Avicenna, *Metaphys. Comp.*, Lib. I, pars II, tr. 4; *Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 6, fol. 100rb.

[44] *Metaphys.*, III, 4, fol. 77r; *Metaphys. Comp.* I, I, 2, p. 23; Forest, *La Structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 207, 227.

[45] *Metaphys. Comp.*, I, IV, 2, p. 190; I, I, 2, pp. 16-17; Forest, *La Structure métaphysique*, pp. 220, 223; Plato, *Timaeus* 50-51, ed. by R. Demos (New York: Random House, 1937).

St. Thomas is referring to that part of the discussion in which Avicenna has anticipated this objection of his readers, "How can you call a knowledge of the singular in the universal, a knowledge of the singular *as singular*?" At this point Avicenna momentarily retreats and says in effect, "Call it what you will. My principal interest is to show how an immutable God can know mutable material singulars and yet remain immutable." He then reaffirms his original view and introduces as his winning card the distinction between time, characterizing human knowledge and the eternity of God's knowledge. He implies, as we have seen, that the eternity of God's knowledge more than compensates for the lack of direct contact with singulars. To say, then, that God knows singulars *now* through their universal causes, should explain how He knows them *as singulars*.[43]

To the extent to which Avicenna thinks he has answered the question, that answer seems to rest on the supposition St. Thomas has suggested; namely, that for Avicenna a singular is constituted as a singular by a coming together of forms. In other words, St. Thomas is saying that Avicenna's view on the *knowledge* of the singular follows logically from a certain view about the *nature* of the singular. If, then, we are to judge of the correctness of St. Thomas's analysis, we must see whether in fact Avicenna held such a view of the singular as St. Thomas has supposed.

To know what is meant by the material singular here, we must know the meaning of matter and the mutual relations of matter and form in the individual thing. Form is not contained in the potency of matter. It has a priority of being over matter and possesses a reality which is superior to that of the composite.[44] This becomes clear when we see how Avicenna describes the nature of the matter to which form gives existence. Matter has no "appetite" for form; it is a simple privation of form; its essence is its receptivity. For Avicenna, as for Plato, matter is a pure receptacle, which must receive forms from without.[45]

These forms come to matter from the agent intellect, the last of the separated intelligences to emanate, mediately, from the One. But something is needed to effect the "information" of the wholly passive receptacle, matter, by the agent intellect. For matter, considered in

itself, could be the subject of two contrary forms and, being passive, contains no reason for preferring one to another. In order that a union between matter and form be effected, therefore, an efficient cause is required; namely, a "preparer" of matter whose function it is to dispose matter to receive a form—that is, to give matter such a disposition that the corresponding form has only to impose itself upon it.[46] Thus the motions of the celestial spheres serve as "preparers" of elementary matter and dispose it to receive one of the four forms of the elements rather than another; after their work is completed, the agent intellect confers the form or forms which the matter is now disposed to receive.

The singular, therefore, does seem to be a form or a collection of forms which have made their passive receptacle be actual.[47] And yet one can ask, What is it that makes these forms one singular thing and prevents their communication to other things? Avicenna answers that it is by matter that forms are individuated and determined.[48] And if we wonder how a passive receptacle, pure receptivity, can accomplish this, the answer is that matter is itself determined to be *this* matter by form.[49] Just how this occurs, Avicenna did not explain; but his meaning might be this, that form is determined by matter in the sense that it loses its attribute of communicability when it is received; a simple reception in matter suffices to individualize form by giving it

[46]*Metaphys.*, IX, c. 5, fol. 105r-v. It is by means of these "preparers" of matter that the agent intellect which ceaselessly engenders a plurality of forms can vary the distribution of these forms without thereby losing anything of its own simplicity.

[47]*Metaphys. Comp.*, Lib. I, Pars I, tr. 2, p. 23.

[48]*Ibid.*, Pars IV, tr. 2, p. 191.

[49]Avicenna, *'Isārāt*, 101-102, as quoted and translated in Goichon, *La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence*, p. 423: "Lorsqu'elles se réunissent (la matière et la forme) l'être de la matière est complet, la forme est individualisée par elle, et ma matière est individualisée encore par la forme, d'une manière qui demande une explication autre que ce résumé." The explanation here promised is not given by Avicenna. Cf. also *Metaphys.*, IX, c. 4, fol. 104vb; Goichon, pp. 423-24, 480-82, and p. 482: "En étant le principe de l'individuation du tout, elle a reçu elle-même l'individuation dont elle a été le principe."

[50]*Metaphys.*, IX, c. 4, fol. 104vb. Cf. Goichon, pp. 423-24.

[51]For a detailed discussion of Avicenna's view of matter, form, their mutual relations, and the place of the *forma corporeitatis* in this discussion, cf. Goichon, pp. 405-82. The necessitated motions of the celestial spheres that prepare matter to receive form are also universal causes which might explain in part how matter becomes this matter. Cf. *Metaphys.*, IX, c. 5, fol. 105r-v.

[52]Gardet, *La Pensée religieuse d'Avicenne*, p. 82.

[53]"L'Être nécessaire connaît les valeurs universelles que les Intellects séparés infusent dans les Ames à propos de la connaissance expérimentale acquise par ces dernières, il n'a, pas à participer à celle-ci" (*ibid.*).

[54]*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 5.

[55]*In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

a numerical difference.[50] But it is also true to say that matter is individualized by form, since form makes it be this particular matter by making it be.[51]

What, then, is the material singular? A form or group of forms rendered incommunicable because their receptacle has itself been individuated by form. However incomplete Avicenna's explanation may be, this much of his meaning is clear: one who would have a complete knowledge of all the universal forms and causes of a thing could know that thing, as one writer puts it, "selon leur maximum de densité ontologique."[52] What more is there to be known about a thing? Only the "experimental knowledge" that human souls and souls of the celestial spheres can have; but such knowledge, involving as it does phantasms and imagination, could only introduce a defect into the knowledge of God without adding any intelligibility to the object of His knowledge.[53] In knowing forms God knows all that is intelligible in things.

This is the view that St. Thomas discerned in Avicenna and rejected as unsatisfactory. "But from assembled universal forms, however many there be, something singular is not constituted. . . . And therefore if someone were to know an eclipse through universal causes, he would know nothing singular but only universal."[54] "For to know a singular in this way in the universal, is not to know the proper nature of this or that singular; in whatever way universals are combined a singular would never be made from them . . ."[55] St. Thomas dislikes the assumption that form is equivalent to thing. He expresses his objection in these terms:

> It should be known that these opinions [including that of Avicenna on the agent intellect as giver of forms] seem to have proceeded from ignorance of the nature of form. . . . For being is not predicated univocally of form and the thing generated. For a natural generated thing is said to be *per se* and properly, as though having being and subsisting in its being; but form is not thus said to be since it does not subsist nor does it have being *per se;* but it is said to exist or be because, by it, something is. . . . For being is the term of making, whence that which properly speaking is made

through itself is the composite. But form is not properly speaking made, but is that by which something is made; that is, it is through the acquiring of form that something is said to be made.[56]

St. Thomas has rejected a univocal view of form and thing and has carefully distinguished between them. Form does not subsist *per se*, nor is it made; but it is that *by* which something is made; it is the thing which, properly speaking, subsists and is made.

St. Thomas's comments are consistent with the context of his own creationist philosophy. For him "creation" is not a necessitated and mediate intellectual emanation but a freely willed and direct production of being. What is produced is therefore neither matter nor form but the whole subsistent thing.[57] It is because creation terminates in the production of things that God's knowledge extends not merely to quiddities but to things.

To indicate the completeness of God's knowledge by way of contrast with human knowledge, St. Thomas uses the analogy of the builder. If a builder could produce an entire house as to matter and form through the form which he has in his mind, then he would have perfect knowledge of that house. But because by his art he only induces the form into pre-existing matter, his art is only a likeness of the form of the house. Through merely knowing the form, then, he cannot know this or that house as an individual house except by sense perception. But since the divine art produces not only form but also matter, through His art Gods knows both universals and singulars.[58]

That God knows singulars because He is the cause of their whole subsistent being, matter as well as form, is often stressed by St. Thomas.[59] Matter and individuating accidents are not remote from His knowledge, since they are not foreign to being, for matter is *ens in*

[56]*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 8, resp.

[57]*Ibid.*, a. 1, resp., and ad 12.

[58]*In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1; *De An.*, a. 20; *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 5.

[59]*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 11; *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 7, and q. 8, a. 11; *In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3. "Deus est causa rei, non solum quantum ad formam, sed etiam quantum ad materiam, quae est principium individuationis; unde idea in mente divina est similitudo rei quantum ad utrumque, scilicet materiam et formam; et ideo per eam cognoscuntur res non tantum in universali, sed etiam in particulari" (*In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 3).

[60]*CG*, I, cap. 65; *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3.

[61]*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 8.

[62]*Ibid.*, a. 11; q. 57, a. 2.

[63]"Non autem intelligit omnia esse a se, nisi inquantum est principium essendi eorum" (*Metaphys. Comp.* Lib. I, Pars IV, tr. 2, p. 188).

potentia and accident *ens in alio*. A knowledge of singulars is therefore not lacking to God.[60]

The basic principle upon which St. Thomas's own view depends is that God knows things in the way that He causes them. "Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, insofar as His will is joined to it."[61] "Since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as was stated above, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends."[62]

"Scientia Dei, causa rerum"—this is the very principle to which Avicenna also appealed.[63] And yet the results for God's knowledge are quite different from those in St. Thomas because of a different conception of the relations between creatures and God.

In St. Thomas only God *must* be; creatures have no necessary claim upon existence. If they exist, they do so because a God who *can* get along without them has nevertheless freely willed them to be.

In Avicenna both God and the universe must be; both have a necessary claim upon existence. The problem then is not to explain why creatures exist but how they are related to God, who also exists. He cannot prevent them from being and He cannot intend them to be. But their relation to Him is described in the temporal imagery of emanation. He knows His own essence, and from His act of self-knowledge other things necessarily—and mediately—proceed. No free decree of God's will is involved but only a passive though cheerful acquiescence in what must be. Not only God's knowledge is productive of being but also that of the separate intelligences, including the agent intellect or *dator formarum*. The bearing of this context on our present problem is clear. For here, where creation is a necessary emanation from essence, to know the forms of things is to know things themselves.

It was within this context that Avicenna thought one could hold both that the Necessary Being knows things only in a universal way and that He also has knowledge of singulars. Yet his solution, with or without its essentialist context, was scarcely the meaning intended in the Koran: "Not a leaf falleth but He knoweth it" (*Sûrah*, VI, 59); "not an atom's weight, or less or greater, escapeth Him in the heavens or

in the earth" (*Sûrah*, xxxiv, 3). As though conscious of some inadequacy in the view that he was proposing, Avicenna remarks on the keenness of mind that is needed to harmonize the two opposed statements:

> Sed necesse-esse nihil intelligit nisi modo universali; eius tamen scientiam non latet quam minima atomus sive in caelis sive in terra. Et hoc quidem est de mirabilibus quorum intellectio, nimiam ingenii perspicuitatem requirit.[64]

But to the extent to which his attempted solution is meaningful in his own context, the clue to its meaning can be found in St. Thomas's critical comment: "From assembled universal forms, however many there be, something singular is not constituted."[65]

In this and the other analytical lines we have seen on this problem, St. Thomas is a correct and discerning interpreter of Avicenna's position.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 121. Cf. also *Metaphys.*, viii, c. 6, fol. 100rb.

[65] *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 5.

MATTER AS A SUBJECT OF PREDICATION IN ARISTOTLE

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One of the most characteristic doctrines of Aristotle's theory of science is that the ultimate subject of predication is primary substance. In the opening chapters of the *Categories*, primary substance (e.g., the individual man or the individual horse) is defined in terms of its important function in predication; that is, primary substance is that which is neither present in nor predicable of any subject.[1] When establishing the possibility of demonstrative science in the *Posterior Analytics*,[2] Aristotle takes great pains to find a conclusive proof that there is an ultimate subject of predication upon which all scientific demonstration depends. And these are but two of many texts in the Aristotelian *Corpus* in which primary substance is appealed to as the ultimate subject of predication. One can safely maintain, therefore, that this doctrine is an essential systematic point in the philosophy of Aristotle.

However, there are six texts in the *Metaphysics*[3] in which Aristotle refers to matter as a subject of predication and sometimes even as an ultimate subject of predication. This raises an obvious problem. It appears as though Aristotle is contradicting himself, and if so, his whole theory of predication and demonstrative science is seriously weakened. This apparent contradiction lies at the heart of Aristotelian philosophy and is worthy of very careful consideration. For the whole of Aristotelian science rises or falls on the doctrine that primary substance is the ultimate subject of predication. It is our purpose in this paper to examine individually each of those texts in the *Metaphysics* in which matter serves as a subject of predication in order to see if the contradiction referred to above is real or apparent. Notice

that our problem lies in the area of *predication*. Aristotle often refers to matter as a subject or substrate of form in a *metaphysical* context. This meaning of matter as a subject is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine that primary substance is the ultimate subject of predication and hence is not the problem in which we are interested. But there are some texts[4] in which Aristotle says that matter is a subject of *predication*. It is precisely here that our difficulty lies. Realizing, then, that the present problem is to determine how matter is involved in predication for Aristotle, let us examine the pertinent texts one by one.

The first of these texts appears in Book One of the *Metaphysics*. In this first book Aristotle is giving what might be called a history of Greek philosophy up to his own times. The positions of the earlier thinkers are briefly outlined and criticized from the point of view of the Aristotelian theory of the four causes.[5] Aristotle is attempting to show that his predecessors had imperfectly anticipated his doctrine of the four causes, but that none of them had succeeded in fully determining the doctrine in any detail. When he comes to the examination of Platonic philosophy in chapter six, he summarizes his criticism as follows.

> Plato, then, declared himself thus on the points in question; it is evident from what has been said that he has used only two causes, that of the essence and the material cause (for the Forms are the causes of the essence of all other things, and the One is the cause of the essence of the Forms); and it is evident what the underlying matter is, of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the One in the case of the Forms, viz., that this is a dyad, the great and the small.[6]

According to Aristotle, Plato has overlooked both the efficient and the final cause in the elaboration of his philosophy. Platonic metaphysics deals only with formal and material causes. Moreover, both the Forms and the One are described as formal causes; the Forms are the formal causes of the essences of sensible things, while the One is

[1] *Categories* 2. 1b3-9; 5. 2a11-13.
[2] *Posterior Analytics* i. 19-22.
[3] *Metaphysics* A. 6. 988a8-15; B. 1. 995b36 and 4. 999a32-b2; z. 3. 1029a8-25; H. 2. 1043a6; 0. 7. 1049a19-37.
[4] *Supra*, n. 3.
[5] *Ibid.*, A. 3. 983a24-b6.
[6] *Ibid.*, 6. 988a8-13.
[7] *Sophist*, 251-54.

the formal cause of the essence of the Forms. This formal causality which is found at two levels in Platonic thought takes place through participation. The One is participated in, or is predicated of, Plato's material principle (the dyad, the great and the small), thus generating the Forms. The Forms, in turn, are participated in, or are predicated of, the same material principle, thus generating the sensible things of the material world about us. By this double participation or predication all of the beings of Plato's universe are generated. And, according to Aristotle, the ultimate basis for Platonic participation and predication is matter. Hence the meaning of matter as a subject in this text is that matter is that principle of Platonic metaphysics in which the Forms and sensible things are generated by successive predications. And this meaning of matter as a subject is, of course, totally foreign to systematic Aristotelian thought. For Aristotle the ultimate basis of predication is primary substance; for Plato it is matter, the dyad, the great and the small. Aristotle is pointing out here the same difficulty in Platonic thought which Plato himself faces in the *Sophist*.[7] For the Forms to be knowable, they cannot exist in isolation but must somehow intermingle. This interweaving of the Forms requires that they somehow also enter into participation. Hence for Plato even the Forms are generated. This generation takes place by the participation of the dyad in the One. It is this point which Aristotle is emphasizing in the text quoted above. The reality of both the Forms and sensible things for Plato is due ultimately to successive participations of the dyad. The dyad is the material cause of these participations while the One and the Forms are formal causes. Hence Aristotle concludes that Plato uses only two of the four causes in the elaboration of his metaphysics. And of these two causes matter is the ultimate subject of Platonic participation and hence also of Platonic predication.

It is also interesting to note that according to Aristotle's evaluation the essences of all things for Plato are ultimately the same. The One is the essence of the Forms and through the Forms is also the essence of sensible things. If this Aristotelian evaluation is correct—and there seems to be nothing in Plato's writings to contradict it—then for Plato there are ultimately no positive differences between the essences of

things. Thus it appears that Plato really has not succeeded in overcoming the monism of the Parmenidean notion of being; it would seem that for Plato being also in a sense is one, because ultimately the One is the cause of the essence of all things. And by contrast this emphasizes the anti-Parmenidean and anti-Platonic spirit of Aristotle, who asserts that there are various differences in being which are signified by the categories. At any rate it is clear that in the text we have been examining, matter as subject of predication is used in a Platonic context and is thus not directly related to Aristotle's own theory of predication.

There are two texts in the Third Book of the *Metaphysics* in which Aristotle again mentions matter as a subject of predication.[8] These texts occur in the aporematic treatment of Book B and should be handled accordingly. Aristotle is asking himself whether a form can exist apart from matter and, if so, what the conditions for the existence of this separated form will be. This question is obviously being phrased by Aristotle in a Platonic fashion in order to indicate a problem which his own metaphysics must meet. In the formulation of this problem Aristotle defines "concrete thing" as "the matter with something already predicated of it." In the Greek the word "kategorethē" is used here. This is the aorist passive form of the verb and indicates that the matter under discussion is matter existing in a composite ("sunolon") which already has been completely generated in the past. The predication mentioned in these texts is Platonic predication. For Plato the individual is a composite because it has been generated by the participation of matter in some Form. And in this way in a Platonic context Forms are said to have been predicated of matter. Hence matter as a subject as it appears in these two texts of Book Three of the *Metaphysics* also refers to the Platonic theory of predication.

In the third chapter of Book Seven of the *Metaphysics* there is a peculiar text in which Aristotle once again mentions matter as a subject.[9] A literal translation of this text would be as follows.

> I call matter that which in itself is called neither a what, nor a quantity, nor any of the other things by which being is determined.

[8] *Metaphysics* B. 1. 995b36 and 4. 999a32-b2.

[9] *Ibid.*, Z. 3. 1029a20-25.

[10] *Ibid.*, 1029a27-29.

> For there is something of which each of these is predicated, and whose being is other than each of these predicates. For the other predicates are predicated of substance, and substance itself is predicated of matter. Thus the ultimate subject is not a what, nor a quantity, nor anything else.

In order to understand this difficult and obscure text it is necessary to relate it to the whole context in which it appears. It will be remembered that in Book Seven of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle is determining the various meanings of substance as it is found in things. In chapter three of this book the meaning of substance as substrate is under examination. The three possibilities of matter, form, and composite of matter and form are suggested as meanings of substance as substrate. Of these three suggested possibilities, substance as matter is ultimately rejected as a legitimate meaning of substance because matter does not have the characteristics of "separability" and "thisness."[10] The text we have quoted above appears in Aristotle's examination of substance as matter. The rejection of matter as substance is effected by a *reductio ad absurdum* argument. Throughout the whole text Aristotle is assuming that matter is substance; and by arguing on this assumption, he then attempts to show that absurd consequences are involved.

Here is the whole argument. The notion of matter is introduced by saying that matter is what remains when all positive determinations have been "stripped off" or removed from a being. This results in the definition of matter which is given in the first sentence of the text quoted above. Matter is neither the "what" nor the quantity nor any of the other categories, for these categories represent the various positive determinations of being which have been removed in arriving at the notion of matter. Now there must be something (which in this argument turns out to be matter) which is the ultimate subject of these categories. For the categories are all predicated of something, and, Aristotle adds, this something is other than the being of the individual categories. Now the accidental categories are predicated of the category of substance, and in turn substance is predicated of the ultimate subject ("to eschaton"). But since we are arguing on the as-

sumption that matter is substance, then, according to Aristotle's argument, this ultimate subject of predication must be matter. Now if matter is the ultimate subject of predication, then matter must be a "this." This point has been established in the *Categories,* where the ultimate subject of predication is characterized as being "ho tis."[11] But, as a matter of fact, matter is not a "this," since matter is that which, by definition, is wholly indeterminate. Thus the argument has been reduced to a contradiction (i.e., matter both is and is not a "this"); and the original assumption that matter is substance must be rejected. To put this whole argument into shorter form, we might say that, if matter is substance, then matter is the ultimate subject of predication, which is impossible because matter is not a "this."

This discussion of matter as a subject amounts to Aristotle's rejection of matter as the ultimate subject of predication. If our interpretation of this admittedly difficult text is correct, then it might also be added that Aristotle is directly opposing himself here to the Platonic theory of predication. We have seen that for Plato the ultimate basis for participation and predication is his material principle, which is called the dyad or the great and the small. For Aristotle, however, matter cannot be the ultimate subject of predication, for this leads to an open contradiction. Matter would then have to be and not be a "this" at the same time. Hence matter is not the ultimate subject of predication. Matter is not substance.

St. Thomas's comments on this discussion of matter as a subject of

[11] *Categories,* 2. 1b3-9; 5. 2a11-13.

[12] "Sciendum autem est, quod id, quod hic dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quarum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo; sed oportet hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis. Unde subjungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative.

"Non est ergo intelligendum, quod substantia actu existens (de qua hic loquimur) de materia praedicatur praedicatione univoca, sive quae est per essentiam. Iam enim supra dixerat, quod materia non est quid, neque aliquid aliorum. Sed intelligendum est de denominativa praedicatione, per quem modum accidentia de substantia praedicantur. Sicut enim haec est vera: homo est albus, non autem haec: homo est albedo, vel: humanitas est albedo, ita haec est vera: hoc materiatum est homo, non autem haec: materia est homo, vel: materia est humanitas. Ipsa ergo concretiva, sive denominativa praedicatio ostendit, quod sicut substantia est aliud per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam aliud est materia ab formis substantialibus. Quare sequetur quod illud quod est ultimum subjectum per se loquendo, 'neque est quid,' idest substantia, neque quantitas, neque aliquid

predication are worthy of note.[12] He tells us that it is necessary to distinguish between what he calls univocal predication and denominative predication. Univocal predication is had when the subject and its predicate are not other in essence. His example is the predication "Man is an animal." "Man" and "animal" are the same in essence here in the sense that "animal" is part of the essence of "man." In general, a univocal predication is had when a genus is predicated of one of its species. On the other hand, denominative predication is had when the subject and its predicate are other in essence. Thus in the predication "Man is white," "white" is not part of the essence of "man." Hence this is a denominative predication. He then goes on to point out that there are two kinds of denominative predication. The first type is had when we predicate an accident of a substance. This is not a univocal predication because an accident and its substance are not in the same category. Moreover, since substance and accident are not the same in essence or quiddity, then the accident must be predicated of the substance concretely and not abstractly. Thus we do not say "Man is whiteness," but rather "Man is white." A second type of denominative predication is had when form is predicated of matter. This is not a univocal predication because form and matter are essentially different from each other. Moreover, as we have seen above, a denominative predication requires a concrete and not an abstract expression. In this second case, however, it is the subject which is expressed concretely. Thus we do not say "Matter is man," but rather "This material thing is a man" ("hoc materiatum est homo"). Matter, concretely expressed, serves as the subject of this second type of denominative predication.

With these distinctions of kinds of predication in mind, St. Thomas points out that, when Aristotle says that substance is predicated of matter,[13] he is referring to the second type of denominative predication as outlined above. St. Thomas interprets this very difficult text, then, as meaning that according to Aristotle there is a special kind of predication in which matter functions as the subject. And he calls this a denominative predication. According to St. Thomas, consequently, Aristotle in this text is describing a special kind of predication in which matter is a subject.

In Book Eight of the *Metaphysics* another mention is made of matter as a subject of predication.

> Now none of these differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter, yet it is what is analogous to substance in each case; and as in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself, in all other definitions also it is what most resembles full actuality.[14]

Matter is mentioned in this text as a subject of actuality in the formulation of a definition. The matter referred to here is not primary matter but rather a genus; while the actuality is not the substantial form but the differentia of the definition. This is the doctrine that in a definition the genus is taken from the matter and the differentia is taken from the form. And Aristotle indicates that this matter-form relationship is not restricted to definitions of substance but is to be found in all definitions. The important point for our present concern is that in this text matter does not mean primary matter as found in things but rather the genus as matter in the definition. This is another meaning of something being predicated of matter in Aristotle and is perfectly consistent with his theory of predication.

In Book Nine of the *Metaphysics* there is a very important text in which Aristotle explains how matter enters into discourse according to his own theory of predication.[15] W. D. Ross's translation of this text is somewhat misleading. It is necessary to examine the Greek to uncover Aristotle's teaching on this problem. The literal translation of the first part of this text is as follows.

> It seems that when we call something not a "this" but a "thaten," that is, the box is not "wood" but "wooden," and the wood is not "earth" but "earthen," and again earth if it is similarly not something else but a "thaten"—the "that" is always simply in potency to what comes after it. . . . And if there is some first thing which is never

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aliud quod sit in aliquo genere entium" (*In VII Metaphysicam*, lect. 2 [Cathala No. 1288-89]).

[13] *Metaphysics* Z. 3. 1029a23.

[14] *Ibid.*, H. 2. 1043a3-7.

[15] *Ibid.*, Θ. 7. 1049a19-b1.

[16] "ἔοικε δὲ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλ' ἐκείνινον — οἷον τὸ κιβώτιον οὐ ξύλον ἀλλὰ ξύλινον, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον γῆ ἀλλὰ γήϊνον, πάλιν ἡ γῆ εἰ οὕτως μὴ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ ἐκείνινον — ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο δυνάμει ἁπλῶς τὸ ὕστερόν ἐστιν . . . . εἰ δέ τί ἐστι πρῶτον ὃ μηκέτι κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται ἐκείνινον, τοῦτο πρώτη ὕλη· οἷον εἰ ἡ γῆ ἀερίνη, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ μὴ πῦρ ἀλλὰ πύρινος, τὸ πῦρ ὕλη πρώτη οὐ τόδε τι οὖσα" (*ibid.*, Θ. 7. 1049a19-27).

[17] *In IX Metaphysicam*, lect. 6 (Cathala No. 1839-43).

called a "thaten" according to something else, this is primary matter. Thus if earth is "airy," and air is not fire but "fiery," then fire is primary matter and is not a "this."[16]

The first line of this text distinguishes between two kinds of predication. One type of predication is had when the predicate is a "this"; that is, the category of substance. A second type is had when the predicate is not a "this" but a "thaten." The use of Greek terms in this text is significant. The second type of predicate is referred to as "ekeininon." This unusual Greek word is derived from "ekeinos" which is the demonstrative pronoun meaning "that" (Latin "ille"). The word "ekeininon" is an adjectival form of the pronoun "ekeinos." "Ekeininon" is not an accepted word in Greek vocabulary and has obviously been invented by Aristotle for his own philosophical purposes. It is well translated into English by the word "thaten." It is also quite clear in the text under discussion that the word "ekeininon" is opposed to the word "tode." Thus Aristotle is using the term "ekeininon" to refer to those predicates which do not indicate a "tode" or a "this." In short, a predicate is a "thaten" if it is not contained in the category of substance.

Furthermore, in this text Aristotle supplies us with no special name for the kind of predication which results when the predicate is a "thaten." In his commentary on this passage St. Thomas refers to this type of predication as denominative predication.[17] To facilitate our own discussion, we shall also adopt this name "denominative predication" to indicate a predication involving a "thaten."

Having distinguished these two types of predication, Aristotle then goes on to indicate how the predicate is related to the subject in a denominative predication. The relation is simply this: The predicate is not actual but only potential in relation to the subject. Several examples are given. Wood is not actually a box but only potentially a box, and earth is not actually wood but only potentially wood. Since the predicate is the subject only potentially, then we do not say that the box is wood or that the wood is earth. Rather, the proper predication is that the box is wooden or the wood is earthen. Then Aristotle goes on to make a remark that is very significant for our present con-

cern. If we descend, as it were, through the various potential predicates, and if we come to what we might call the ultimate "thaten" (that is, a "thaten" or potential predicate which does not have something else predicated of it as a "thaten"), then this ultimate "thaten" or potency is primary matter. Hence this is at least one way in which primary matter can enter into predication. It can serve as a predicate which is the ultimate "thaten" in a denominative predication. It is also clear why primary matter is the *ultimate* "thaten." For in Aristotelian philosophy, there is nothing which is potential in relation to primary matter. Rather primary matter is potential in relation to all things.

The next step in Aristotle's argument is that there is another class of predicates besides potential predicates which enter into denominative predication.[18] It will be remembered that a "thaten" is any predicate that is not a "this"; that is, a substance. Matter is not a "this"; therefore it is a denominative predicate. Likewise an accident is not a "this"; therefore it also is predicated denominatively. Thus we do not say that a man is music or that a man is pale. An accident is not a "this" but rather a "thaten." Thus for Aristotle an accident is predicated concretely and not abstractly because an accident is not a "this." It should be noted that neither matter nor an accident is a "this," but for different reasons. Matter is not substance;[19] that is, matter is not actually a "this" but only potentially a "this." Thus matter as a "thaten" is related to its subject as potency to act. But it cannot be said that an accident is also only potentially a "this" and is therefore related to its subject as potency to act. For an accident is not a "this" simply because the categories of accident are distinct from, and irreducible to, the category of substance which is properly called a "this." Hence for Aristotle there are two distinct kinds of denominative predicates, or predicates which indicate a "thaten." These two distinct kinds of denominate predicates are matter on the one hand and the various accidents on the other.

With the above distinctions in mind Aristotle then makes a very peculiar remark.

> Whenever this is so, then, the ultimate subject is a substance;

[18] *Metaphysics* Θ. 7. 1049a26-33.
[19] *Ibid.*, Z. 3. 1029a27.
[20] *Ibid.*, Θ. 1049a34-b1.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Posterior Analytics*, i. 22. 83a1-17.

but when this is not so but the predicate is a *form* and a "this," the ultimate subject is matter and material substance. And it is only right that "thaten" should be used with reference to both the matter and the accidents; for both are indeterminates.[20]

Whenever the predicate is a "thaten" (either as matter or as an accident), then the ultimate subject of such predications is a substance. But Aristotle indicates that it is possible to make the "thaten" a subject and the "this" a predicate. We might best describe this kind of predication as an inverted denominative predication. In this way primary matter is not only a subject but in a special sense is even an ultimate subject of predication. A second way, then, that matter can enter into predication for Aristotle is as the ultimate subject of an inverted denominative predication. Hence there is a special way in which matter can serve as both the subject and predicate of a denominative predication.

A definite systematic problem arises as a result of the above doctrine. There is a sense in which primary matter is an ultimate subject of predication for Aristotle. But we have seen that he insists in many other texts that primary substance is the ultimate subject of predication. Is not this an internal contradiction in Aristotle's theory of predication?

A negative answer can be given to this question if we recall some distinctions which we have already seen. An accident, not being a "this," is a denominative predicate. According to the text we are examining,[21] this second type of denominative predication might also be inverted, so that the accidental predicate becomes a subject. Thus we might invert the proposition "The man is musical" and say "The musical is man." This substantive use of the adjective is rather awkward in English but is an accepted expression in Greek. Now Aristotle explicitly rejects accidental predication in which the subject is an accident as not being a properly scientific predication at all.[22] It is possible to speak intelligibly in this way, but the predication involved is really the reverse of what we say. Thus one can say with meaning that the musical is a man, but the predication implied in such a statement is that the man is musical. Likewise, when matter is used

as a subject in an inverted denominative predication, this also is not a genuinely scientific predication. Aristotle's intention, then, seems to be that although one can speak intelligibly when using matter as a subject, this is not a properly scientific predication. Hence matter is an ultimate subject only in an improper kind of predication, and thus Aristotle is not contradicting his doctrine that primary substance is the ultimate subject of predication.

In summary it can be said that matter as a subject has three meanings for Aristotle. The first is matter as a subject in the Platonic sense in which the One is predicated of matter to generate the Forms and the Forms in turn are predicated of matter to generate sensible images. This Platonic doctrine of matter as the ultimate basis for participation and predication is rejected by Aristotle. A second and properly Aristotelian meaning of matter as a subject is the use of the genus as the matter of the differentia in the formulation of a definition. A third and also properly Aristotelian meaning of matter as a subject is the use of matter as the ultimate subject of an inverted denominative predication. Strictly speaking, however, this is not a proper type of predication for Aristotle. Our conclusion, then, is that although Aristotle refers to matter as a subject of predication in the three senses distinguished above, his remarks are compatible with his insistence that primary substance is the ultimate subject of predication. Hence the contradiction pointed out at the beginning of this paper has turned out to be only apparent.

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THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN ST. ANSELM AND DESCARTES *Continued*

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II

According to Descartes "there are only two ways of proving the existence of God, one through His effects, the other through His very essence or nature."[24] It is this second way, through the essence, which has been called Descartes's ontological argument. Its minimal expression is as follows: Examining the idea I have of a perfect being, I find that existence is included in this idea; and consequently it is certain that God, who is this perfect being, is or exists.[25]

To understand Descartes's proof as he himself grasped it, we should remark first that the identification of the idea of perfect being with the idea of God is established within the proof. Such an idea is innate in this way, that I cannot be aware of myself, a *res cogitans,* without immediately knowing myself as an incomplete being, dependent on an infinitely perfect being.[26]

No one who ever read the third and fifth Meditations would hold that the idea of God is, within Descartes's philosophy—any more than in Anselm's—a purely arbitrary idea. Nor is it for Descartes in any way drawn from the senses. It is, in fact, in the third Meditation that Descartes proves the existence of God as unique cause of the innate idea of perfect or infinite being.[27]

In order, further, to grasp Descartes's understanding of his proof we should note that there were not, for him, two innate ideas of God, one at the base of his proof by God's effects and another as principle of the demonstration through God's essence. It is the one innate idea of perfect being which functions in both proofs.

But to be effective in either proof, the idea of perfect being or God must needs be more than the indistinct idea of perfection which

is our initial awareness. Many people may pass their entire lives, Descartes feels, without ever *distinctly* representing to themselves this idea of God. Our clear and distinct idea of God, all the while innate, is an amplification or explicitation of this initial awareness of the idea of perfection by attributing to the idea the perfection we clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the idea of an infinite being.

It is an immediate evidence, for Descartes, that the true idea of perfect being can be nothing less than the idea of the infinite. The idea of God is the idea of being "as actually infinite, so that nothing can be added to his perfection." Despite his repeated use of negative expressions to signify the infinite, Descartes insists that the difference between the infinite and the finite is real and positive. The idea of the infinite is, he claims, a true and positive idea. Ideas formed by negation of the finite Descartes labels indefinite. Hence, by a purely verbal criterion, most of Descartes's stated ideas regarding the infinite would merit his label of indefinite.[28] St. Anselm, likewise, it should be noted, using in most cases the negative expression, makes it adequately clear that his idea of God is of a positively, not a negatively, unique being. Chapters 12-26 of the *Proslogion* indicate the use of both negative and positive terms to signify the perfections of the absolute, necessary, perfect being. As St. Anselm points out in the *Apologetic against Gaunilon*, "that than which a greater cannot be thought" can be understood in no other way than as "that alone which is greater than all." Descartes, too, speaks of God as "the most perfect being that we can conceive."[29]

[24]*Primae Responsiones*, Vol. VII of *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Adam-Tannery (Paris, 1904), p. 120.

[25]*Discours de le méthode*, IV Par., ed. Gilson (Paris: Vrin, 1947), p. 36: "Au lieu que . . . le saurait être." See also: *Meditationes*, V; ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 65-66.

[26]*Meditationes*, III; ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 51-52.

[27]*Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

[28]*Lettre à Clersellier*, 23 avril 1649; ed. Adam-Tannery, VI, 356. "Je ne me sers jamais du mot d'infini pour signifier seulement n'avoir pas de fin, ce qui est negatif, et à quoi j'ai appliqué le mot d'indéfini, mais pour signifier une chose réelle, qui est incomparablement plus grande que toutes celles qui ont quelque fin." Cf. *Contra Hyperaspistem*, août 1641; ed. Adam-Tannery, VI, 427; and *Meditationes*, III; ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 45.

[29]St. Anselm, *Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem*, Cap. V; *PL*, Vol. CLVIII, col. 255c. ". . . Nullatenus enim potest intelligi quo majus cogitari non possit; nisi id quod solum omnibus est majus . . . sic quod majus dicitur omnibus intelligi, et esse in intellectu; et idcirco reipsa esse ex necessitate concluditur." Cf. Descartes, *Sur les Ves obj.*, ed. Adam-Tannery, IX, 209.

[30]"Major autem mea fuit talis: Quod clare intelligimus pertinere ad alicujus rei

Perfections amplified to the infinite enter into the clear and distinct idea of the perfect being for Descartes. But infinity is not, in the *Discourse* or in the fifth Meditation, the characteristic title upon which the proof through essence is based; that characteristic title is the idea of the perfect, whereas in the third Meditation, the proof from causality is based primarily on the idea of the infinite.

That this idea of perfect being be effective as a foundation for proving the existence of its object, it must, in Descartes's eyes, be a clear and distinct idea. It will be clear when the mind is immediately possessed of the idea, without the mediation, for example, of a memory of the idea from some previous perception. Such is the case with the idea of God. An idea will be distinct when it contains all that belongs to it, excluding all that is proper to other ideas. Such is the idea of a supremely perfect being.

We come now to the heart of the Cartesian method as it functions in this proof. While an idea is representative of its object, nevertheless it is the idea which is apprehended primarily; it is the idea which is the proper, immediate object of thought. Consequently, a criterion is necessary to insure that the "idea objects," which are the content of thought, be true "idea pictures" of realities outside the mind. The basic human criterion, prior to the proof of God's existence, is the *cogito* considered as a real judgment and, for Descartes, the first real judgment of existence. Its evident certitude is rooted in the clearness and distinctness of its very content. Transferring the norms of certitude by which he grasps intuitively the real existence of a *res cogitans*, Descartes maintains that the same criterion is properly to be applied to every idea. Clarity and distinctness of idea are the guarantee of conformity to the thing, essence, or nature of which the idea is the image. Clarity and distinctness are likewise the criteria of real existence when existence is seen clearly and distinctly to belong, as a perfection, to the nature of perfect being.

In unequivocal terms, and in many places, Descartes states this principle of his system: What we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to the nature of anything can be affirmed with truth of that thing. If, for example, existence belongs to the nature of God, it can be affirmed that God exists.[80]

Because Descartes assigned nothing to the idea of God which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive ought to belong to it, the idea of perfect being, God, contains no contradictory factors. The idea of perfect being is possible, for the reason that it is clear and distinct. Being possible it can serve as a foundation for the demonstration of the existence of its object.[31] We are here reminded of St. Anselm's demonstrating the possibility of his idea of God as the immediately prior condition for his conclusion of God's existence.

Having established the idea of perfect being as possible, having posited his criterion of evident conformity between idea and real nature, thing, or essence, Descartes is now faced with the key question: Is existence a perfection? If it is, it will be contradictory not to include it in the distinctness of the clear and distinct idea of God. If it is a perfection, then Descartes's criterion of evidence will bring him necessarily to the affirmation of the existence of God.

Descartes is emphatic in affirming that existence is not only a perfection but the highest perfection. Existence therefore must necessarily be attributed to the idea of a supremely perfect being.[32] Once this step is established the conclusion immediately follows. "And, from this fact alone, that I cannot conceive God except as existing, it follows," Descartes says, "that existence is inseparable from Him and therefore it follows that He really exists."[33]

In Descartes we meet another essentialist position, this one based

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naturam, id potest de ea re cum veritate affirmari . . . si existere pertinet ad naturam Dei, potest affirmari Deum existere . . ." (*Sur les Ves obj.*, ed. Adam-Tannery, IX, 150). "Jam vero si ex eo solo, quod alicujus rei ideam possim ex cogitatione mea depromere, sequitur ea omnia, quae ad illa rem pertinere clare et distincte percipio, revera ad illam pertinere . . ." (*Meditationes*, V; ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 65). "Je crois aussi que tout ce qui se trouve dans les idées se trouve nécessairement dans les choses" (Lettre à *Mersenne*, 19 janvier 1642; ed. Adam-Tannery, III, 474). "A nosse ad esse valet consequentia" (*Responsiones Septimae*, ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 520).

[31]"Vel enim ut vulgo omnes, per possibile intelligitus illud omne quod non repugnat humano conceptui; quo sensu manifestum est Dei naturam, prout descripsi esse possibilem, qui a nihil in ipsa supposui nisi quod clare et distincte perciperemus debere ad illam pertinere, adeo ut conceptui repugnare non possit" (*Secundae Responsiones*, ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 150).

[32]". . . neque enim mihi liberum est Deum absque existentia (hoc est ens summe perfectum absque summa perfectione) cogitare . . ." (*Meditationes*, V; ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 66-68).

[33]"Atqui ex eo . . . revera existere . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 66-67).

[34]Gassendi's text, so objecting, is cited in Adam-Tannery, VII, 405. Cf. Descartes, *Meditationes*, V; ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 69-70.

upon the clarity and distinctness of the *cogito* as first principle. Clarity and distinctness in the *cogito*, as well as in all subsequent ideas, are infallible insurance that the necessities of thought are absolutely accurate substitutes for the immutable, eternal necessities of essences. The existence, not only of God but also of sensible reality, will be discovered within the contents of essence, as represented by a clear and distinct idea, or it will not be discovered. When thought is confronted with the necessities of a true, immutable, and eternal essence—and only then—may it effectively reach existence. That is why Descartes never truly succeeded in proving the existence of the external world—because he could never demonstrate existence as a necessary property of the true, immutable, and eternal essence extension. But, in that case alone of the essence of perfect being, its intrinsic necessities render it impossible for Descartes to conceive perfect being as nonexisting. Affirmatively, the intrinsic necessities of this true, immutable, and eternal essence necessitate Descartes's affirming all perfections, including existence, of the essence of perfect being. And this last clear and distinct necessity necessitates, for Descartes, the affirmation that God truly exists. Reality is achieved as a function of that necessity identical with the clear and distinct ideas; that is, with the idea as possible.

We shall here only note that Descartes uses the recently established existence of a perfect being, who could be no deceiver, as a guarantee of the truth of remembered judgments based on clear and distinct innate ideas. God cannot deceive, and it is He who is now known as the creator both of the innate ideas and of the essences which such ideas truly represent. Gassendi adroitly objected that this is circular reasoning, for Descartes proved (*a*) God's existence and perfect veracity through the clear and distinct idea of His essence and then (*b*) that the idea of God is clear and distinct because God is and is truthful.[34]

One might say, in deference to Descartes, that the supremacy of essence over existence is here eminently clear and distinct. God's essence necessarily involves His existence; by reason of His essence, God exists. As a result of the discussions which followed his proof by the essence of God in the *Discourse* and in the fifth Meditation,

Descartes makes strikingly explicit in what supreme degree existence is necessarily involved in an essence which is possible, infinite, and perfect. Because such an essence also involves immense positive infinite power it is *causa sui*.[35] The deepest root for the necessity of affirming God's existence is in a necessity of His essence to exist *per se*, taken in a positive manner.

To protect his first proof, that from efficient causality, and consequently to protect and retain the divine immutable guarantor of the new Cartesian metaphysics and physics, Descartes was convinced that the principle of causality had to be absolutely universal or it would be no principle. To hold that "everything has a cause" requires Descartes to say God too has a cause.[36] Considering the immense and incomprehensible power in the essence of God, we recognize that it is so great that it is clearly the cause of God's existence in the highest positive sense.[37] To avoid a verbal dispute, Descartes decides we need not say God is efficient cause of Himself; yet since we do see that the fact of His existing per se is based on the real immensity of His power, we can say that, *in a certain sense*, God stands to Himself in the same way an efficient cause does to its effect and that hence God exists per se in a positive sense.[38]

What this "certain sense" is, Descartes clarifies by saying: "We must show that intermediate between efficient cause properly speaking and no cause at all, there is the positive essence of a thing, to which the concept of efficient cause can be extended."[39] This intermediary, the positive essence, Descartes terms the formal cause because what is per se comes *as it were* from a formal cause. By formal cause Descartes understands the entire essence of the thing—here, the essence of God with its infinite positive power to be per se.[40] Once this verbal precaution is taken, Descartes at once extends the concept of

[35]". . . atque adeo sit quodammodo sui causa. Deumque talem esse intelligo . . ." (*Responsiones Primae*, ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 108).

[36]*Responsiones Quartae*, ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 238.

[37]". . . dicimus Deum a se esse, non amplius negative, sed quam maxime positive" (*Responsiones Primae*, ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 110).

[38]*Ibid.*, p. 110-11.

[39]*Responsiones Quartae*, ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 239.

[40]"Cum autem integram rei essentiam pro formali hic sumo" (*ibid.*, p. 242).

[41]*Ibid.*, p. 238.

[42]". . . existentia necessaria . . . in eo solo essentiae partem facit" (*Responsiones Quintae*, ed. Adam-Tannery, VII, 383).

[43]*Monologium*, Cap. VI; *PL*, Vol. CLVIII, col. 152d.

efficient cause to the essence of God, thereby establishing God's necessary existence on the positive infinite power of His essence to exist as *causa sui.*

It is evident that, for Descartes, the essence of the cause is identical with the functioning of its causality. The causality of the cause is not prior to the exercise of the causality in Descartes's philosophy. Consequently, in identifying the idea of efficient cause with the idea of God's essence, Descartes is led to the conclusion that "the consideration of efficient causality is the first and principal, not to say the only means we have of proving the existence of God."[41]

Infinity, as evidenced in the idea of an infinite being and in the infinite positive power of God's essence, is now the characteristic trait of both of the proofs by efficient cause. The notion of God as *causa sui* completes the idea of perfection by expressing the infinite power of the divine essence, which infinite power makes existence a necessary perfection. Here we have the full implications of a position wherein essence is so supreme that even God's own existence calls it its cause. The absolute subordination of existence to essence is starkly exemplified by Descartes's maintaining that "necessary existence in God alone is *a part* of his essence."[42]

Though St. Anselm considered God as primarily *essentia,* it is notable here that in explaining God's existing per se St. Anselm insisted that God in no way assisted Himself to become what He was not, nor did He in any sense cause Himself.[43]

From the viewpoint of St. Anselm, Kant's criticism is unjustified, as it is from the viewpoint of Descartes. If one holds, as did St. Anselm, a realism of essences accompanied by a Platonic-Augustinian notion of being as essence, then the law of contradiction displaces sensible intuition and principles of possible experience as the criterion of a concept's necessity, truth, and reality. If one holds, as did Descartes, the *cogito* as the first real noncontradictory judgment of existence, then clear and distinct ideas become the criterion and guarantee of real essences, while real essences become in turn the exclusive criterion of real existence. Descartes presupposes no sense experience to the *cogito* and its consequences. Nevertheless, neither he nor St. Anselm would consider this a defect but a necessity in positions where real

essences are supreme and existence is no more than some function of essence. Convinced that we contact, through sensible intuition, an existential given and that the synthesis by which the concept is generated is rooted in this sensible intuition, Kant regards as empty any concept not resting in some way on this sensible intuition. From that point of view, his criticism is justified. His starting point is not St. Anselm's or Descartes's. It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze Kant's own position in which existence is not, as for St. Anselm and Descartes, a modality of the essence but a modality of judgment. Were such an analysis made, let us say in the light of the Thomistic metaphysics of the primacy of existence, a-priori categories of modality would be shown to Kant to be as "ontological" as the realism of essences.

Marquette Workshop in Teaching of Philosophy

FRANCIS C. WADE, S.J., *Marquette University*

The Department of Philosophy of Marquette University, Milwaukee, conducted a four-day philosophical workshop in the teaching of philosophy, from June 13 to June 16. This year the workshop was a part of Marquette's seventy-fifth anniversary celebration. The workshop is planned as part of the Marquette summer session every other year. The registrants for the workshop numbered 50—22 priests, 17 sisters, 11 laymen. The registrants came from 16 states—from both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts—and from two provinces of Canada. Together with the staff of 18, the registrants spent 4 days in an arduous and profitable discussion of philosophical problems.

The daily program of the workshop consisted of small group discussions in the morning, after a brief presentation of the problem for that day by the discussion leader. These discussions were summarized briefly and the summaries were the basis of the general discussions in the afternoon, directed by the discussion leader for that day. The evenings were set aside for special events in line with the purpose of the workshop.

The general purpose of the workshop was to improve the teaching of philosophy by considering those philosophical ideas which would determine the technique used and the content taught. The problem for the first day, presented by Dr. John O. Riedl, was "The Role of Philosophy in Catholic Education." The problem for the second day, presented by Father Gerard Smith, S.J., was "The Relationship between Philosophy and Theology." The problem for the third day, presented by Dr. Charles J. O'Neil, was "The Relationship between Philosophy and History." For the fourth day the problem presented by Father George P. Klubertanz, S.J. (Saint Louis University), was "The Relationship between Philosophy and Science." Besides the discussion leaders, the workshop staff consisted of 14 members of the Marquette Department of Philosophy, plus Father Gerald Van Ackeren, S.J., Department of Theology (Summer Session), Mr. Leroy Wauck, Department of Psychology, and Father Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R. (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto).

Fifty-third Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association

LINUS J. THRO, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

The American Philosophical Association, Western Division, held its fifty-third annual meeting April 28-30 at East Lansing, Michigan, the State University of Michigan acting as host. The program, as has been characteristic of Western Division programs the past few years, was somewhat weighted in the direction of analytic and semantic inquiries; there was, however, a resurgence of interest in questions of broader concern. Among other instances of this, John J. Neumaier (Hibbing Junior College) and Maurice Natanson (University of Houston) considered from different points of view the significance of the individual in history. George Plochmann (Southern Illinois University) in a rapid and objective review of the situation of cybernetics directed attention to the genuinely philosophical problems which arise in this field.

Social and ethical problems were given somewhat scattered and uneven consideration. The paper of Robert Rein'l (Louisiana State University) on the utilitarian position served to emphasize the instability and normative deficiencies of utilitarianism. Campbell Garnett (University of Wisconsin), working from the Platonic definition of justice, interpreted moral norm to mean a psychological uniformity of behavior required for self-perfection, much as the equilibrium of physical functioning is a conditioning law for the maintenance of health. The problem of free will as treated by Francis Raab (University of Minnesota) resolved itself easily in the distinction of a causal and a noncausal meaning of "could."

Some metaphysical issues were raised tangentially: Herbert Hochberg (Northwestern University), for example, showed that Quine's use of the ontological operator breaks through the narrow syntactic limits of formal logic and that his discussion of existence violates the character of the object language. The explicitly metaphysical examination of analogy by Niels Nielson (Rice Institute), although open to historical objections, had its points of interest and stimulated considerable discussion. The paper attempted a unified interpretation of analogy in Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas in terms of varying emphases upon the divine transcendence and immanence to the world.

Three symposia were held concurrently on the afternoon of Friday, April 29. One, under the chairmanship of Wilfrid Sellars (University of Minnesota), dealt with induction. Another, on human relations and international obligations, was conducted by Richard McKeon (University of Chicago).

The third, an unusual one for an American congress of philosophers, commemorated the hundredth anniversary of Søren Kierkegaard. The contributions to this symposium were as follows: a scholarly examination of Kierkegaard's philosophical skepticism, by Richard Popkin (State University of Iowa); an extraordinary collection of evidences for Kierkegaard's interest and competence in logic, by Paul Holmer (University of Minnesota); a pseudonymously critical effort by Walter Kaufmann (Princeton University); and, finally, a competent discussion of the three papers by William Earle (Northwestern University), with an especially trenchant critique of the last-named.

Among other matters settled at the annual business meeting, it was decided to hold next year's meeting at the University of Indiana in Bloomington. The following were elected to hold office for the coming year: Max Fisch (University of Illinois), president; O. K. Bowsma (University of Nebraska), vice-president; and May Brodbeck (University of Minnesota), secretary-treasurer. The outgoing president, Charner Perry (University of Chicago), will represent the division at the Eastern meeting of the association.

Chronicle

The Metaphysical Society of America held its sixth annual meeting at the University of Chicago, March 25 and 26, 1955. The first afternoon session was a symposium on logic and metaphysical method, with papers by Richard Martin (University of Pennsylvania) and Frederic B. Fitch (Yale University); the commentator was George P. Klubertanz, S.J. (Saint Louis University). Professor Martin maintained that logic and methodology were metaphysically neutral, could be set up prior to and independently of metaphysics, and would be of great help in solving metaphysical problems and disputes. Professor Fitch maintained that propositions have an independent reality, and proposed a metalogic to formalize all systems of metaphysics. The commentator maintained that a wholly independent logic was covertly an idealistic metaphysics and that the problems and disputes of metaphysics had to be solved on other than merely logical grounds. The lively discussion which followed showed that the metaphysicians present were by no means ready to concede that metaphysical problems were but logical problems in disguise.

At the evening meeting, the retiring president, Professor Charles Hartshorne (University of Chicago), held that the very meaning of certain tautologies implied the eternal existence both of absolute and of relative

being. He contended, for example, that the proposition "Nothing exists" was entirely meaningless. The commentator, John E. Smith (Yale University), tried to show that the argument was essentially Platonic in trend and presupposed the priority of essence over existence.

In the morning meeting, Professor Calvin D. Rollins (Brooklyn College) tried to defend Locke's argument for the limitation of the human intellect. The commentator, Paul Weiss (Yale University), pointed out that the paper was valid only against the objections of semantical positivists, and did not establish the rationalistic position in itself. Professor Milic Capek (Carleton College) tried to provide a basis for physical theory by deriving space from time in a modified Kantian manner; the commentator, Robert M. Palter (University of Chicago), showed that physics has its own validity and neither is based on a philosophy nor grounds one. In the afternoon session, there was a panel discussion of freedom, the participants in which were Newton P. Stallknecht (Indiana University), Francis C. Wade, S.J. (Marquette University), and William Earle (Northwestern University). Professor Stallknecht considered some of the existential conditions of freedom; Father Wade placed the essence of freedom in the inner act of voluntary adherence to a concrete object; Professor Earle likewise took a realistic view of interior freedom, finding its basis in a subject which is a self and which is therefore both cognitively and conatively reflexive. Newton P. Stallknecht was elected president of the society for the coming year.

The American Catholic Philosophical Association held its twenty-ninth annual meeting in Philadelphia, April 12 and 13, 1955. The four major papers were on the general theme of knowledge and expression. In the first paper, Anton C. Pegis spoke on our knowledge of God, the destiny of man. He took the *Contra Gentiles* as an instance of one kind of knowing that a Christian could have. The arguments from reason in the *Contra Gentiles* do not have a different kind of rationality than do the arguments of the "philosophers," but they are in a different "state"; that is, in a state of being used by theology. Theology as a human science depends on philosophy; philosophy depends on faith for its health, by reason of the philosopher, not by reason of the nature of philosophy. The Reverend Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., showed that there are three distinct knowledges of nature: metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and physical science. He showed, moreover, that these three knowledges did not formally depend on each other. John A. Oesterle gave a paper on poetic knowledge, deriving his development mainly from Aristotle. Herbert T. Schwartz, speaking on our knowledge of knowledge, inveighed against the pride of the pure thinker and maintained that theology was the only study worthy of a Christian. In the evening session, after a greeting to all the delegates from His Excellency,

the Most Reverend John F. O'Hara, D.D., Archbishop of Philadelphia, a volume of commemorative essays was presented to Charles A. Hart in honor of his twenty-fifth year as national secretary of the association by the Reverend James A. McWilliams, S.J., editor of the volume. Father Hart responded with an address in praise of the Catholic University as a center of Scholastic thought. Elizabeth G. Salmon read the citation for the award of the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas medal to the Reverend Gerald Smith, S.J. Father Smith spoke on the place of philosophy in a Catholic college, arguing that as grace requires nature as a perfectible subject, so theology requires philosophy, which therefore ought formally to be studied in a Catholic school. The retiring president, Charles J. O'Neil, spoke on practical knowledge and liberty. He showed that practical knowledge involves will and the commitment of the whole person, and that conversely liberty flows from practical knowledge.

In the afternoon sessions, there were six round-table discussions, some of which applied the general theme to particular historical or systematic areas. In the business meeting, the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J., was elected vice-president for the coming year, and Doctor Vincent E. Smith took over the presidency.

On April 13, there was a joint session in Atlantic City of the American Catholic Philosophical Association and the National Catholic Educational Association. The Reverend Francis C. Wade, S.J., spoke for the association. He made the point that since education aims at bringing about knowledge, the task of education must be guided by truth rather than by the subjective needs of the student, important as these latter are.

The Association for Realistic Philosophy held its spring meeting in Cambridge, May 13 and May 14. There were two papers: Hubert Dreyfus (Harvard University), "Is Heidegger's Anthropology Compatible with Realism?" and Harold Durfee (Park College), "Contemporary Philosophy and Religious Commitment."

Les Archives de Philosophie was founded in 1923 and had a high reputation as a scholarly journal. It is now announced that it will reappear as a quarterly; it will be edited at Vals-près-Le-Puy (Haute Loire) and be published by Beauchesne at Paris. The first number of the new series is scheduled for October, 1955.

Canon Augustin Mansion, for more than forty years a professor at the University of Louvain, was honored at a special day, April 29, 1955, by his colleagues. On the occasion, a memorial volume of studies, entitled *Autour d'Aristote, Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale,* was presented to him.

ARMAND MAURER, C.S.B., *Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies*

***Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros ("Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, Versionum Latinarum,"* Vol. VI, 1). The Mediaeval Academy of America Publication No. 59. Ed. F. S. Crawford. Cambridge, Mass., 1953. Pp. xxi + 592.**

Research in medieval philosophy has long been hindered by the lack of good editions of the source books of the philosophers of the Middle Ages. Indeed, in some cases no editions of these sources are available, and where possible one must resort to manuscripts. The need for good editions is particularly acute in the case of the medieval Latin versions of Aristotle and his Arabian followers, Avicenna and Averroes. Medieval philosophers had their works constantly by their side and freely drew from them and criticized them. The historian of medieval philosophy must likewise make them his companion if he is to understand the subject of his research.

It is heartening to see that some brave and patient souls are undertaking to fill this lacuna in the researcher's library. The editors of the *Aristoteles Latinus* propose to publish all the medieval Latin versions of Aristotle's works. Mlle. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, of the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris, is preparing an edition of the Latin version of Avicenna. In 1931 the Mediaeval Academy of America undertook the publication of the Hebrew, Arabic, and Latin versions of Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle in a series entitled "Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem," under the general editorship of H. A. Wolfson, D. Baneth, and F. H. Fobes. Up to the present, two volumes have appeared in the Latin series: Vol. VII, *Averrois Cordubensis Compendia Librorum Aristotelis Qui Parva Naturalia Vocantur* (ed. A. L. Shields and H. Blumberg) and Vol. VI, 1, the Great Commentary on the *De Anima*, the subject of the present review.

Averroes wrote a Compendium and a Middle and Great Commentary on the *De Anima*, of which only the last two are extant. There is only one manuscript extant of the Middle Commentary, and fifty-seven of the Great. Professor Crawford made his scholarly edition of the Great Commentary,

and the accompanying Latin version of the *De Anima,* on the basis of the five oldest and least similar manuscripts, relying chiefly on the oldest (Bibl. Nat. lat. 15453). The critical apparatus contains the variant readings of these manuscripts and also probable emendations from the first edition (1472) and the Junta edition of 1550. The editor notes that these editions very often reject good readings of the manuscripts (p. xx).

The edition is printed in large clear type and arranged for the maximum utility of the reader. Averroes' text is divided in the traditional manner, and each division is preceded by the corresponding text of Aristotle's *De Anima,* printed in italics. The Bekker numbering of Aristotle's text is given so that the reader can quickly locate the corresponding Greek passage. The lines are numbered according to the 1550 edition.

Three useful indexes are appended: a Greek-Latin index of Aristotle's vocabulary; a Latin-Greek index to the first index; and an index of names and things in Averroes' commentary.

It is perhaps ungracious to ask anything more of the editor after the great labor of preparing this excellent edition. It is regrettable, however, that it does not contain the references to the works of Galen, Themistius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and so on, cited by Averroes. The verification of these citations would have been very useful to the reader. It would also have been helpful if the references to other works of Aristotle mentioned by Averroes had been given. As it stands, however, the edition is a very welcome addition to the library of the historian and student of medieval philosophy. It is to be hoped that editions of the other commentaries of Averroes will soon appear.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

La Pensée religieuse du jeune Hegel. **By Paul Asveld. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1953. Pp. ix + 244.**

God and Space-Time: Deity in the Philosophy of Samuel Alexander. **By Alfred P. Stiernotte. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xxvii + 455. $3.00.**

These two monographs are revised doctoral dissertations from Louvain and Harvard. They reflect the growing tendency among the historians of modern philosophy to recognize the crucial importance of the problem of God. An interesting divergence of method is noticeable in these books, in-

dicating how one's approach has to be adapted to the nature of the questions under investigation. Dealing as he does with a philosopher whose intellectual environment is now remote from us, Asveld assumes the historical and comparative viewpoint. He is primarily concerned with helping us understand the Hegelian background, terminology, and influences. Stiernotte takes a more systematic approach and discusses in a critical way the various issues raised by Alexander's philosophy of God. Perhaps because his aim is the more restricted one of precise description without evaluation, Asveld's work achieves the greater measure of conciseness and unified impact. The book on Alexander cites so many current authorities on such a wide range of special points that the main argument sometimes gets lost.

By "the young Hegel" is meant Hegel during the period of his formative years, until his acceptance of a post at Jena University in 1801. There is a plentiful harvest of books on this early period by German scholars, but Asveld is the first to make a thorough study in French. For the most part, his findings agree with Theodor Häring's exhaustive *Hegel, sein Wollen und sein Werk,* except on the important question of the personality of God. The present study rightly maintains that the Hegelian Absolute is impersonal even in the first sketches of this philosophy. In English, we are fortunate in having the Knox-Kroner translation of Hegel's *Early Theological Writings,* which gives the main relevant texts in Hegel himself. But Asveld has performed the welcome service of relating these texts to some key writings of Fichte and Schelling, so that the historical situation can be appreciated.

With the help of Schelling, the young Hegel was trying to break away from the Enlightenment and Kantian rationalism. One of the key instruments was the concept of alienation or estrangement, which predates the use made of it in the later dialectical system. When man is subjected to tyrannical political and social forces, his integrity is threatened, and hence he conceives of the Absolute as something entirely foreign to this world and safe from its temporal conditions. There is a mutual alienation of God and man, for they are conceived as utterly separate objects. A new interpretation of God was proposed by Hegel in order to release man from servitude to alien forces. He advanced the pantheistic notion of reality as a divine totality, with finite selves included within the Absolute. Yet, as Asveld is careful to note, Hegel was not yet in full possession of his later doctrine, where the Absolute develops to self-consciousness in and through man. Nor did the Hegel of the first period yet affirm the primacy of philosophy and pure knowledge over religion and love. That was because he still identified philosophy with Kantian critical reflection and did not envision it in terms of a total speculative metaphysics.

What this work demonstrates very clearly is the origin of many factors of the Hegelian dialectic in the early doctrine on God. The leading concepts of positivity, alienation, and reconciliation were first broached within a theological context. Hegel reduced to technical philosophical form the Wolffian naturalization of Christian revelation and then pointed out that the whole account would be intolerable for human freedom unless it were subordinated to his intuition of one divine totality. On only one point does Asveld fail to do justice: he underplays the findings of such Marxian scholars as Kojève and Lukacs. His own stress on the subordination of God to the work of reconciling freedom and destiny in man is not so very far removed from the Marxian interpretation of Hegel in terms of an anthropocentric interest.

Hegel is mentioned only once or twice in Stiernotte's book, since Spinoza was a much more potent influence upon Alexander. The author does not examine the pertinent historical problem of whether the Spinoza whom Alexander read was colored by the evolutionary and historical elements introduced into the concept of God by Hegel and Schelling. Instead, he plunges directly into an analysis of *Space, Time, and Deity* in order to establish the precise meaning of God and Deity and whether this meaning can sustain a genuine religious response on man's part. In the course of exposition and criticism, the opinions of Boodin, Inge, Pringle-Pattison, Laird, and others are examined. The author himself has a partiality for the theological speculations of Whitehead and H. N. Wieman, and the latter has written a commendatory foreword.

Stiernotte does reject the view of Alexander which fragmentates the deity into many phases and locates its existence in a future infinity. He observes that the presumed future qualities are nonexistent, either in finite or infinite mode, and hence cannot exert any power over the present course of space-time. But this criticism is made only to remove Alexander's compromise with theistic transcendence, since Stiernotte himself proposes a totally immanental view of God. He regards God as a nisus or process that is completely immanent in the actual world and identified with the whole ongoing impulse of life. This position is not reached by any independent argument, however, but results from an attempt to remove inconsistencies in Alexander with the help of Bergson's vital impetus and Whitehead's theory of process. Yet Bergson's reluctance to make an outright identification of God with the vital impetus and Whitehead's insistence on the eternal objects are disturbing factors which the author does not succeed in removing.

As far as Alexander himself is concerned, his difficulty stemmed from the assumption that theism presents an exclusively transcendent God and pantheism an exclusively immanent one. Because he saw that God must be

both present in the world and somehow distinct from it, Alexander felt compelled to try to combine theism and pantheism in a single theory about God. He was pantheistic in respect to space-time as the body of God, and "theistic" in holding that deity is a nisus located beyond the highest achieved quality in the world. But he never understood the actual theistic position which holds that God is intimately present to the world precisely because of His transcendent way of existing and operating. Hence Alexander was led to confuse transcendence in being with a dynamic tendency in an outward direction. This directional substitute for the infinite manner of divine existing does come within Stiernotte's criticism that the future is nonexistent. But this objection does not affect the theistic doctrine on divine transcendence, so that the issues are not properly joined. Since one's theory of the nature of the religious response to the nature of being depends in large measure on one's theory of the constitution of being, the question of religious availability of God-as-universal-nisus remains similarly suspended.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

The McAuley Lectures, 1953. Truth and the Philosophy of Teaching. **I, "The Eminence of Teaching," by Etienne Gilson; II, "Teaching and the Freedom to Learn," by Anton C. Pegis. West Hartford, Conn.: Saint Joseph College, Department of Publications, 1954. Pp. 28. $1.00.**

This is the first in what promises to be a valuable Catholic lecture series. It has been established at Saint Joseph College by the Sisters of Mercy, in honor of their foundress, Mary Catherine McAuley. Professor Gilson's lecture is a thoughtful reconsideration of the role of the teacher in relation to the student. He argues that there is little essential difference in teaching methods, that all teaching is directed to one climactic objective: to bring the student to the moment of personal discovery. Dr. Pegis carries on the theme in the second lecture, discussing the relations of freedom and authority in the teaching act. His talk is an important clarification of the problem of academic freedom in Catholic schools today.

The McAuley lectures are to be presented annually. All who are interested in the future of Catholic education and scholarship will wish success to the project and its director, the Reverend Francis J. Lescoe.

BEATRICE H. ZEDLER, *Marquette University*

La Théorie de l'intellect d'après Aristote et ses commentateurs. **By O. Hamelin. With an Introduction by E. Barbotin. Paris: J. Vrin, 1953. Pp. xxv + 93.**

In this work the author of *Le Système d'Aristote* (Paris, 1920) examines in a more detailed way Aristotle's theory of the intellect and its main interpretations in the history of Western thought. This study is not, however, just another record of the relevant facts but a book which elaborates a thesis. Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect, thinks Hamelin, must be sought within his commentators and those commentators reveal Aristotle as a Platonist.

Both aspects of the thesis give rise to questions. Can the true Aristotle be found in Aristotle's own works or in the works of his successors? It was the ambiguity of Aristotle's texts on the intellect that led the author to interrogate history. But granting that some implications of a man's thought may be brought to light by his successors, one might ask, as does the editor of the book in his critical introduction, Can remote disciples express the thought of the master better than the master himself? Are the interpreters faithful to their text, or have they deviated from it and bent its thought in a new direction so as to create in effect an original work?

Hamelin does, it is true, look first at Aristotle's text; but he reads it with an eye to the second part of his thesis. He is well aware of Aristotle's role as the critic of the theory of ideas and as the exponent of an empirical approach in philosophy. Yet he finds that Aristotle's effort to substitute his theory of intellect for Plato's theory of ideas results in making Aristotle himself an unconscious idealist. In the famous formula, "The intellect in act is the intelligible in act," for example, Hamelin sees not mainly the expression of an intentional union of the knower and the thing but of a real union in which the whole reality of intellect is absorbed into that of the intelligibles. But where intellect is constituted as a being by the intelligibles, Ideas are primary; whether Aristotle knows it or not, he has therefore retraced his steps to Plato.

In the greater portion of the book Hamelin cites Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Simplicius, Averroes, and St. Thomas as peripatetic thinkers who in their own works have succumbed to the Platonism hidden in Aristotle's thought. In each of these chapters the two-pronged assumption is open to question in one or both of its parts: (*a*) that the thinker discussed is a Platonist in his doctrine of intellect; (*b*) that the alleged Platonism ex-

presses the real Aristotle. How, for example, can one seriously maintain (*a*) that St. Thomas is, in the last analysis, a partisan of Platonic idealism and (*b*) that in this respect, though he is more realistic than Aristotle, the "disciple" follows the master? (Cf. pp. 79-81.)

That Aristotle should reveal the influence of Plato is not initially improbable. As Gilson suggests in *Being and Some Philosophers* (Chap. II), such an influence can be seen in Aristotle's metaphysics, notably in his doctrine of substance. But if it be true that in his theory of intellect Aristotle restores the very theory of ideas that he had vigorously banished, then this thesis must be established on firmer grounds than those that Hamelin here presents. It should be noted, though, that since Hamelin himself did not submit the work for publication, he may not have regarded it as a completed study.

Barbotin, the editor, has stated that his aim in publishing the manuscript was not primarily to honor Hamelin's memory but to stimulate the interest of scholars in the Aristotelian problem of the intellect. The work, together with Barbotin's good critical introduction, should achieve this purpose.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

***Ethics.* By P. H. Nowell-Smith. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 324. Paper, 85¢**

The dominant trend in British philosophy today is toward a special type of logical empiricism. This was especially noteworthy at the 1953 International Congress of Philosophy, where the Englishmen seemed a tribe apart. Mr. Nowell-Smith is a fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. His book bears the *imprimatur* (in an editorial foreword) of A. J. Ayer, the high-panjandrum of British empiricism.

In contemporary British ethics (or better, moral philosophy) the big fight is between intuitionists (such as Ewing), who are right but can't quite explain why, and empiricists (Ayer, Stevenson et al.), who are wrong, but very nimble critics of older types of ethical theory. The procedure of the logical empiricist is to reduce philosophical work to the analysis of words and statements made by philosophers. This procedure can be used on moral philosophy and that is what Nowell-Smith does. His book covers most of the topics usually treated in ethics: the relation of ethics to science, the act of choice, good, right, oughtness, obligation, moral rules, conscience, freedom, and responsibility. He has heard about Aristotle and rather thinks

he was on the right track but, in the main, Nowell-Smith confines his reading to the twentieth century. His aim is to bring about some clarity in moral propositions. It must be admitted that he makes penetrating criticisms of the looseness of moral discourse, and his examples are fresh and well chosen. It would do a great many Thomistic ethicians good to read this little and inexpensive book.

PALMER L. ROCKEY, *Saint Louis University*

Time and Idea. The Theory of History in Giambattista Vico. **By A. Robert Caponigri. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953. Pp. viii + 226. $3.00.**

Although Caponigri is primarily interested in Vico's theory of history, he does consider the natural law, the science of humanity, the modifications of the human mind, and providence—all topics directly relevant to Vico's philosophy. The author rightly sees how important the concept of natural law is in the Vichian schema, and hence he treats at length the Vichian concept of *verum* and its relationship to *certum*. *Verum* concerns the eternal order of things; *certum* pertains to human authority. Caponigri tells us that *verum* and *certum* as dimensions of the law stand in dialectical relationship to each other—indeed, are almost contradictions. Such a relationship, according to the author, causes Vico to see the difficulties which the classical Platonic and Neoplatonic principle of participation bring about. Thus Vico seeks another principle to realize the mediation of the *verum* and the *certum* of the law. Under an altered form, Platonism re-enters into the Vichian final synthesis to become its constitutive principle. It re-enters by the concept of history, as the principle of the ideal movement of history toward the fullness of an idea. The total process of the formation of positive law moves toward the fulfillment of the idea of law.

In describing this movement of concrete process toward the idea as its fulfillment Caponigri is correct, for Vico looks at the positive law in terms of its historical development toward its goal. It would have been better, however, to use the Vichian phrase "the eternal order of things" rather than Caponigri's expressions such as "the plenitude of the idea" and "the ideality of the law." The latter suggest Plato's world of Ideas and its many attendant problems. It would have been wiser for the author to designate precisely what type of Platonism influenced Vico most. Caponigri does not lay enough stress on the great influence of St. Augustine on Vico's

thought. However, Caponigri does emphasize sufficiently, and well, the influence of Roman law on Vico, especially the "sette dei tempi," the notion of time in relation to the problem of law.

In regard to the Vichian concept of the science of humanity, Caponigri rightly stresses Vico's great concern for man as a social being. The social nature of man causes him to generate, sustain, and fructify the relations of the community. However, Caponigri does not sufficiently note Vico's interest in man as an individual, and this especially in reference to a supernatural end which he must attain by means of his own individual efforts in co-operating with grace.

In speaking of the Vichian concept of science and wisdom, Caponigri states the notion that science has its metaphysical basis in that conception of total presence which is the ultimate principle of the Platonic idea. But it is very important to mark out clearly just what elements of Plato's metaphysics Vico accepts before one uses such Platonic language. Such expressions used by Caponigri as "wisdom is presence as idea," as "totality," "the plenitude of being and existence in an order of nature" really confuse rather than clarify matters. Caponigri is justified in pointing out the heavy influence of Plato's thought on Vico. What we are questioning is his use of troublesome terminology to handle Vico's position, so that it is very difficult to know at times what elements of Platonism are kept and what principles are rejected and how they are refuted. This is important if we are to understand fully Vico's position. Although Caponigri has offered valuable insights in his interpretation of Vico, there is still much to be done by English scholars on the very problems Caponigri has discussed and many others which do not come under the scope of his book.

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Ontology. **By James K. Feibleman. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. Pp. 807. $9.75.**

The title of this book is surprising and misleading. Instead of dealing with the philosophy of being, the author pretentiously proposes an ontological philosophical system which is intended to be the best account of all the theories and facts for modern empirical knowledge derived from the scientific method. Everything in experience contributes to the knowledge of ontology, including the four divisions of human culture, viz., science, art, philosophy, and practice. Because this ontology aims at being a world-view

description in finite terms of the whole universe, nothing lies outside this ontological system. Ontology is, therefore, the widest finite system; and Feibleman summarizes his systematic ontology as being a philosophy of energy-relations—a study of values and their logic in the three universes of essence, existence, and destiny. This ontological system openly professes to be an ideal or logical ontology, which is alternately referred to as finite ontology, ontological philosophy, ontological positivism, empirical metaphysics, and axiological realism (the AR-system).

Before explaining his axiological realism, the author leads the reader into a cursory and casual excursus into the history of philosophy. His treatment of philosophers and systems of philosophy other than his own is flippant and flagrant. When Feibleman says, for example, that Aristotle's straight jacket was imposed on Christian culture by Aquinas, on Jewish culture by Maimonides, and Moslem culture by Alghazzali, and that these, in turn were bars to further development in knowledge systems (p. 48), one immediately undertakes the reading of this book with a hesitating distrust. To say, further, that St. Thomas's theology adopts the official philosophy of Aristotle (p. 96) and that St. Thomas's faith cannot be defended by reason (p. 51), is an indication that the author's understanding of St. Thomas's penetrating analysis on the relations between faith and reason is remarkably deficient.

Axiological realism confesses to be a finite ontology tentatively held; it is a hypothetical system necessarily subject to revision and always confronted with the following paradox: men are destined to speculate about ultimate questions; for example, the nature of God, immortality, and evil. They are equally destined not to find the answers to these questions. Axiological realism, therefore, admits of being an open and somewhat original system or theory following the principle of fallibilism introduced by Peirce and Whitehead. This system is partially skeptical in its examination of existence and partly dogmatic in its acceptance of existence. In this way, the system begins with a minimal faith. (Faith is the validity of reason and the data of experience.) Further, axiological realism is meant to be a delicate balance between idealism (essence) and nominalism (existence). This ontology has its start in Reid's objection to Hume; it sets up postulates and draws hypothetical deductions from these. Postulates are the terms used by fallibilism to describe faith, and belief is the feeling that postulates are true. The following is a summary of the nature of the AR-system. The AR-system consists in certain logical elements called (*a*) terms, (*b*) a postulate-set, (*c*) theorems, (*d*) rules of inference, (*e*) deductions, enriched with (*f*) definitions. These are the ontological language and the language of enlightened common sense. In sum, this position boasts of meeting the test of consistency with relevant truths; completeness, or the inclusion of relevant

theories and facts; and applicability.

Feibleman's ontology deals with the three universes: (1) the universe of essence which contains laws and deals with pure possibilities, (2) the universe of existence which describes the fields according to structure and organization, and deals with actualities, and (3) the universe of destiny which contains the sciences and deals with those actualities which are directed toward pure possibilities. The universe of essence, which is primary, is intended to correspond to Plato's Ideas and Whitehead's eternal objects. Existence is defined as the power to affect or be affected, or to elect or be elected. Essence and existence are the two universes of being which constitute the primary categories of ontology. The secondary categories of ontology are matter-energy, space, time, motion, and force. Destiny (called evolution by Peirce and creativity by Whitehead) is the category that accounts for the relations between essence and existence; it is the natural direction of existence towards essence because actuality is always an effort toward possibility.

The place of theology in this vast system is interesting. Theology is systematic ontology treated qualitatively or affectively and allowed an infinite run; it is a mythological presentation of ontology. Since everything in this system is hypothetical, so, too, is God a hypothesis rather than a dogma. The church, Feibleman adds, should have human foundation, and he advocates a church of the unlimited community with Socrates as its savior (p. 514). Perhaps the author has Josiah Royce's world community in mind. Not only does theology receive a curious treatment in this book, but all the sciences are treated in a confused and unintelligible way. The strange admixture of logical-mathematical-scientific data into philosophy leaves this system with a lack of unity or distinction in knowledges. We are left with massive scientific data, touching upon everything in experience, but lacking a true and adequate explanation of reality. The true metaphysician will derive little profit from this book.

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The Meaning of Existence. A Metaphysical Enquiry. **By Dom Mark Pontifex and Dom Illtyd Trethowan. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1953. Pp. vi + 177.**

The philosophical scene in England today is dominated by Positivists and logical analysts, who have little sympathy with metaphysical speculation

A few voices are being raised, however, in defense of the value of metaphysics. Among them are the authors of the present work, which sets out to answer the question "What is existence?" and thereby lay the basis of a natural theology. In the opinion of this reviewer, however, the attempt is not very successful.

The authors' aim is to show, contrary to Bertrand Russell, that "existence" is not an accidental and dispensable linguistic concept, but one that expresses a special aspect of reality, not expressable by other words (pp. 1 and 2). They maintain, first of all, that "existence" or "being" means assertibility. It is that which makes assertion possible, "for what we assert is nothing else than existence or being or reality" (p. 8). This position, however, far from rescuing metaphysics from logic, only confuses the two, for assertibility or predicability is a logical relation and not a feature of reality. (Cf. St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia,* chap. 3). Moreover, in inquiring into the source of assertibility, one need not conclude, with the authors of this book, to the existence of God but to that of the human intellect. It is not surprising to find the authors agreeing with St. Anselm's proof for the existence of God, which rests precisely on the confusion of logic and metaphysics.

The authors' second attempt to analyze existence may seem at first sight more successful. Existence means "particular things under the common aspect of their dependence on an external source" (p. 25). But as they clearly see, the reduction of existence to such a relation makes it impossible to say that God exists in any proper sense of the term. Moreover, it is rather surprising to find this description of existence in a book of supposedly Thomistic inspiration. Students of medieval philosophy will recognize it as that which Henry of Ghent and Vital du Four proposed in opposition to St. Thomas's conception of *esse.* At the end of the book, the reader has the impression that, in analyzing existence, the authors have done exactly what they set out to avoid: they have expressed it in terms other than itself, and, in so doing, existence itself has slipped them by.

These and similar views are put forward as being in the spirit of St. Thomas, and even as more Thomistic than those of the "strict Thomists." Certainly, like St. Thomas, the present authors believe that a metaphysical enquiry about existence is possible and fruitful. Moreover, they have written a highly readable book and have stated their positions clearly and forcefully. But the resultant metaphysics of existence bears little resemblance to St. Thomas's metaphysics of *esse.* The words of Bañez in the sixteenth century are still true today: "And this is what St. Thomas so often exclaimed,

and what Thomists will not hear: that *esse* is the actuality of every form or nature . . ."[1]

[1]"Et hoc est quod saepissime D. Thomas clamat, et Thomistae nolunt audire: quod esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae . . ." (*Comm. in I*, q. 3, a. 4 [ed. Luis Urbano (Madrid, 1934) I, 141]. This is quoted in E. Gilson, "Remarques sur l'expérience en métaphysique," *Actes du XIème congrès international de philosophie* (Brussels, 1953), p. 8.

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The Life of Reason, or the Phases of Human Progress. **By George Santayana. New one-volume edition revised by the author in collaboration with Daniel Cory. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1954. Pp. viii + 504. $6.50.**

Of the triumvirate of pioneer American naturalists—Santayana, Dewey and Cohen—it was the first-named who provided the earliest and, in many respects, most forceful statement of naturalism. The five small volumes of *The Life of Reason* were first issued in 1905-1906. They gave naturalism a program and provided the premises for all of Santayana's own later writings. While he was exploring the realms of essence and spirit during the nineteen-twenties, Santayana was accused by Dewey of abandoning the basic principle of naturalism that there are no metaphysical dualities in being. His quick retort was that Dewey himself was at fault for failing to see that spirit and essence can be treated naturalistically as dimensions of the human imagination, without implying any transcendent reality beyond nature. Santayana rightly regarded his own later studies of the various realms of being as conforming with the principles set forth in his earlier work.

As though to give visible form to his concern for adhering closely to his original outlook, Santayana devoted the last year of his life to a careful revision and condensation of *The Life of Reason* for the instruction of a new generation of readers. Working with his friend Daniel Cory, he completed the task shortly before his death. At the end, then, he returned to his philosophical beginnings and reaffirmed them in a more concise and emphatic way. As Cory remarks, "a sustained effort was made to dispel those early mists of idealism from the realistic body of his philosophy, and to make clear to the reader that our *idea* of a natural world can never be *that world itself*." If anything, Santayana the old man is more rigidly a believer in self-contained material nature than was Santayana the youth. He makes it

indisputably clear that for him the most sublime flights of art, religion, and metaphysics are projections of imagination which never outstrip our world and never give knowledge of God and spiritual realities. His tolerance and even sympathy for such soarings never blinded him to their earth-bound nature, according to his basic postulate.

This new edition of *The Life of Reason* is valuable not only as making again available the first statement of the naturalistic postulate but also for illuminating the present dispute between naturalism and realism. Anyone who may be inclined to dismiss Santayana as an obsolete thinker should first consult the commemorative issue of the *Journal of Philosophy* (Vol. 51, No. 2, 1954), containing the papers read at Harvard after his death. Of special interest is Donald C. Williams' provocative article on "Essence and Existence in Santayana," which underlines Santayana's systematic depreciation of existence as a "truly monstrous excrescence and superfluity." Williams then contrasts this position with what he archly refers to as the piggish avidity of Thomists for existence. The emotional tone of this article should not distract from its main message: the case for naturalism is based on an anti-existential theory of reasonable living. The naturalistic "life of reason" consists in the play of imagination upon a world of material existents, fundamentally lacking in intelligibility. The constructs of imagination in the various realms of being are flights from existence rather than inferences based upon the intelligibility of being as existent. Santayana peoples his realms of being with alluring shades, but he does not succeed in breaking through the charmed circle of imagined essences.

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Approaches to God. **By Jacques Maritain. Trans. from the French by Peter O'Reilly. "World Perspectives," Vol. I, ed. by Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. xvi + 128.**

In the preface M. Maritain says that he will deal with only some of the approaches to God, those "which from the point of view of philosophical reflection would seem to be the principal ones" and which are within the competence of natural reason. In pursuance of this aim the author takes up, first, prephilosophic knowledge of God, then philosophical demonstration (St. Thomas's five ways and a sixth peculiar to the author), and, finally, that knowledge proper to the practical intellect, the knowledge connatural to poetic experience and the first free moral choice. The testimony of

mystics is added, not as a proof, but for the auxiliary role it actually played in Bergson's discovery of God.

One will look in vain for a treatment of St. Augustine's or St. Anselm's approaches, but M. Maritain promised neither to be exhaustive nor to discuss proofs which he would consider invalid. One will find little that he has not said before; but that too is taken care of in the preface, for "it is the grouping of these diverse approaches in an articulated whole which, it seems to me, gives interest—if it has any—to the present work." The work definitely is of interest, though perhaps not for all the readers that the editor of "World Perspectives" had in mind.

The first chapter on prephilosophic knowledge of God is valuable for showing the possibility of a genuine knowledge of God's existence which is neither explicit demonstration nor irrational feeling ("intuition" in William James's sense). It should have considerable meaning for an age faced with those imminent threats to existence which alone, for many, seem to be able to turn grasp of existence from a notional to a real awareness. It would, in fact, seem to have been written with a view to uncovering the rationality missed by existentialist interpretations of ultimate situations. With the help of its analysis one can more readily detect the specific activity of the human intellect where one might have judged an interpretation to have been only emotional.

While there is deep wisdom in M. Maritain's judgment that "it would be necessary, before proposing the philosophical proofs, to be assured in so far as possible . . . that the minds to which one addresses oneself are alive to the primordial intuition of existence, and conscious of the natural knowledge of God involved in this intuition" (p. 11), still it might be asked if such intuition is the only prephilosophic speculative knowledge of God possible. It does account admirably for the experiences of some unusually gifted people such as Tolstoy, Oscar Wilde, Alfred Noyes, the Maritains themselves, and even of ordinary people in unusual situations such as war, torture, the concentration camp, and the humanly hopeless situation of the chronic alcoholic. But what of ordinary people in ordinary circumstances? Might not the more ordinary way to God be through wonder at the order of the universe? St. Thomas in his commentary on St. John's gospel speaks of the argument through God's governance as the most efficacious, putting it ahead of the argument from motion, which, because of its starting-point, the *Summa* claims is *manifestior.*

Of St. Thomas's five ways, the subject-matter of the second chapter, M. Maritain says, "We propose to restate the very same arguments, divesting them, however, of all the examples borrowed from ancient physics and formulating them in language appropriate to our time" (p. 23, footnote).

This he does admirably. His answers to objections drawn from atomic physics, the dynamics of Einstein, and the calculus of probabilities are succinct and penetrating.

In view of the widespread misunderstanding of cause as meaning no more than regular temporal sequence it might have been profitable in the second chapter to have said a word on the traditional understanding of the term. This remark presupposes that M. Maritain is addressing a non-Scholastic audience, a supposition seemingly justified by the series in which the English translation appears as the first volume. "World Perspectives," edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, is meant to have a universal appeal, as can be seen from the editor's foreword and from the list of contributors, which includes such strange bedfellows as Brock Chisholm and Father d'Arcy, Hu-Shih and Paul Tillich, Einstein and Adenauer. M. Maritain's original French work, however, would seem to have a Catholic, even a Thomist public in view, for it supposes familiarity with the meaning of act and potency, essence and existence, cause and intuition.

In Chapter III M. Maritain proposes a new way. There are two moments in it, of which one is to the other as the primordial intuition of Chapter I is to the five ways of Chapter II. The first or prephilosophic moment hinges on an intuition of the supra-temporality of thought in the actual exercise of its most separated act (extra-perceptual thought). At this precise instant it appears as a scandal that this intensely vital operation of thought should ever have been nothing, yet the fact cannot be escaped that it did come into existence. With most people the certainty of having been born obliterates any insight into the supra-temporal, spiritual nature of thought. But, if both facts are faced, and a solution really sought, it is seen (by M. Maritain, at any rate) that I, in my thinking, pre-existed, obviously not as I, but in some other existent and in the mode of that other, as known, as lived.

No doubt it is hoped that this will strike a sympathetic chord in phenomenologists and existentialists. It is free from the trappings of philosophic demonstration and is based on thought seized in its innermost subjectivity. But one might wonder how primordial such an intuition would be, how truly prephilosophic. Might it not have been released in M. Maritain's case only after long preparation by philosophic reflection on the nature of thought, immanent operation, personality, and so on? This in no way would lessen the validity of the intuition but would assimilate it to the flash of understanding sometimes achieved by the scientist after long familiarity with his field.

The second moment is that of philosophical elaboration of the intuition in terms of causal pre-existence. It is considered unnecessary to broach

the question of a *per-se* series on the ground that from the extra-temporal, personal perfection of thought, which is experienced as flashes of nonsuccessive existence, one can go immediately to a unique, personal, extra-temporal cause. Perhaps the closest parallel to the immediacy of this leap is the insight had by the Greeks (cf. E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy,* Chap. I) that only a personal divinity (or divinities) can be responsible for human beings in the uniqueness of their thought and free originality.

After this new way, new by the criterion of a difference in starting point, come admittedly brief indications of the knowledge of God by way of poetic experience and moral choice. But, for all their brevity, one would like to have seen some explanation of connaturality. The dictionary definitions ("innate," "belonging naturally," "of like nature") are not helpful. One could also desire clarification of the term "unconscious" as applied to the nonconceptual knowledge of God "present in act in the depth of the soul by virtue of the first choice of its freedom, when this choice is right" (p. 99). How can a knowledge be formal and actual and yet unconscious? Does M. Maritain mean any more than that an object, actually known, is not fully recognized, as in Aristotle's example of the veiled figure of Coriscus who is not known to be Coriscus? The first free act has the ethical good as object, the choice of which implicitly involves choice of the Supreme Good; this, I take it, would be to know God under a disguise. To call this nonrecognitional practical knowledge unconscious is to add to a confusion already confounded by much modern usage.

The final chapter on the desire to see God fittingly crowns the roster of natural approaches, in that this desire is "the mark of the possibility . . . of a knowledge of God superior to reason, which is not due to reason, but to which reason aspires." In this connection M. Maritain's explanation of St. Thomas's assertion that a desire of nature cannot issue in an absolute impossibility is well put: "It is in no wise necessary that it *be* satisfied, since it asks for what is impossible to nature. But it is necessary that by some means (which is not nature) it *be able* to be satisfied, since it necessarily emanates from nature" (p. 112).

The translation by Father O'Reilly is painstaking, accurate, and readable. Occasionally the French idiom creeps in, as, for instance, when "notre esprit" is translated by "our mind" (we would normally use the plural), or when the article is retained as in "the human reason." In some places the translator makes the author sound overly dogmatic, a trait that would hardly recommend him to "World Perspectives" readers. Thus to the objections, which M. Maritain leaves in the form of questions, the translator is wont to add categorical tags such as: "This is the answer" (p. 36), and "The answer is clear" (p. 147) and "There is a good answer" (p. 54).